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ARE CONSUMER CLASS AND MASS ACTIONS
DEAD? COMPLEX LITIGATION STRATEGIES
AFTER CAFA & MMTJA
Nicole Ochi*
I. INTRODUCTION
This is a story about power. Corporate America is a fearsome
thing to behold. It is the prevailing force in modem life; the largest
corporations are richer than entire nations and have more rights than
people.' In the face of the corporate behemoth, it is virtually
impossible for individual victims of corporate wrongdoing to obtain
compensation unless they band together.' One way that individuals
can band together is through a representative class action for
damages. In a class action, the named plaintiffs seek monetary relief
on behalf of a class of individuals who have suffered a common
injury.3
Class actions are controversial because the unnamed members
are not parties and do not participate in classwide proceedings yet are
bound by the adjudication of common issues.4 To bring a class
action, plaintiffs must meet stringent requirements, which include a
* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Asian Studies,
Pomona College, May 2003. Many thanks to the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review for their long and uncompensated hours on this Article, with special thanks to
Winston Stromberg and the Developments team for all their encouragement and support. I also
would like to thank my husband for his unwavering support, love, and humor that sustained me
throughout this process.
1. See generally TED NACE, GANGS OF AMERICA: THE RISE OF CORPORATE POWER AND
THE DISABLING OF DEMOCRACY (2003) (describing the rise of corporate power and addressing
the question: "How did corporations get more rights than people?").
2. See Edward F. Sherman, Decline and Fall: As the Golden Age of Consumer Class
Actions End, the Question Now Is Whether They Have Any Future, A.B.A. J., June 2007, at 51.
3. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS ACTION
DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 1 (2000).
4. See ROBERT H. KLONOFF, CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION IN A
NUTSHELL 15 (3d ed. 2007); see also HENSLER ET AL., supra note 3, at 79-85 (discussing the
temptation for plaintiff counsel to collude with defendants for pecuniary benefit).
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demonstration that "common issues of law or fact predominate" and
that a class action is "superior to other methods for fair and efficient
adjudication."5
A less controversial way for individuals to band together is to
bring a mass action, in which numerous named plaintiffs aggregate
their claims.6 Unlike in class actions, all parties are plaintiffs and
participate in the proceedings.7 Because a mass action has fewer
preliminary requirements, it is frequently used in personal injury
cases, when individual causation issues typically preclude class
certification.8
There are three primary ways to form a mass action. First,
plaintiffs may file a joint suit against a common defendant if their
claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence (or same series
of transactions or occurrences) and if they have any question of law
or fact in common.9 Second, if multiple actions are pending in
multiple district courts, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,
upon its own motion or a motion of a party, can consolidate and
transfer cases involving one or more common questions of fact to a
single district for pretrial purposes." Third, if multiple actions are
pending in the same federal district, the court may consolidate
actions involving a common question of law or fact for pretrial and
trial purposes.11
The ability to aggregate claims through class and mass actions
makes them powerful weapons for plaintiffs. They serve the twin
purposes of compensation and deterrence 2 by providing a way for
people to obtain compensation when individual litigation does not
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (applies to damages class actions). For a discussion of other
class categories, see ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §
4:1 (4th ed. 2007). In addition, all class actions must satisfy the four prerequisites under FED. R.
CIV, P. 23(a): (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy. For a detailed
discussion of these prerequisites, see William R. Shafton, Developments, California's Uncommon
Common Law Class Action Litigation, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 783 (2008)..See also CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 1759-71 (2007).
6. Brian Quinton, What Happened to Class? Plaintiffs' Lawyers Seek Mass Action, Not
Class Action, to Push Large Personal Injury Cases, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 2005, at 44.
7. KLONOFF, supra note 4.
8. Quinton, supra note 6, at 44.
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 20 (permissive joinder of parties).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a).
12. Sherman, supra note 2, at 52.
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justify the expense'3 and by deterring corporations from engaging in
injurious behavior.14  For example, class actions have forced
corporations to recall harmful products,'5 end unfair business
practices,16 and clean up the environment. 7 Moreover, they promote
efficiency by permitting common adjudication of multiple lawsuits. 8
For decades, corporate defendants have decried class and mass
actions because they provide tremendous settlement leverage to
plaintiffs. 9 According to critics, the possibility of an immense
judgment forces corporate defendants to settle even weak or
frivolous suits against them.2" In addition, critics allege that
plaintiffs' attorneys are the real winners, while individual consumers
receive negligible compensation.2'
In recent years, corporate lobbyists have gained ground against
class and mass actions. Their successful reform efforts started in
1995 with the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"),22
continued with the Securities Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA")23
13. E. Powell Miller et al., Commentary, Meritorious Class Actions Survive the Class Action
Fairness Act, MICH. LAW. WKLY., Jan. 30, 2006.
14. Id.; see generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA 's Impact on Litigation as a Public
Good, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-
1005021 (arguing that class actions perform an "ex post" regulatory function, provide a critical
supplement to government regulation, and generate significant external benefits); see also Alec
Johnson, Developments, Vioxx and Consumer Product Pain Relief- The Policy Implications of
Limiting Courts' Regulatory Influence over Mass Consumer Product Claims, 41 LOy. L.A. L.
REv. 1039 (2008).
15. E.g., Medical Tool Firm Settles Defibrillator Investigation, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 3, 2007, at
16 (discussing defibrillator settlement and recall).
16. E.g., Calif Ruling Could Alter Title Business; Old Republic Must Refund $13.8 Million,
NAT'L L.J., May 28, 2001, at BI (discussing a case in which title company had to refund $13.8
million to 400,000 customers for pocketing the secret interest generated in escrow accounts).
17. E.g., Some Big Judgments Were Settled After Trial, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 17, 1994, at S14
(discussing Escamilla v. Asarco Inc., No. 91-CV-5716 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 23, 1993), in which a
refinery agreed to spend $11 million to clean up contaminated soil).
18. Id.
19. See generally HENSLER ET AL., supra note 3, at 15-37.
20. Sherman, supra note 2, at 52.
21. Id. But cf Burch, supra note 14, at 3 (explaining that class actions are a public good
because they produce litigation that deters wrongdoing).
22. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 26
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (providing heightened, uniform
standards for class actions and other suits alleging fraud in the securities market): see infra Part
H.A. 1.
23. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (federalizing most securities
actions); see infra Part II.A. 1.
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and the Multiparty Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002
("MMTJA"), 4 and culminated with the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005 ("CAFA").25  These class action reforms have essentially
federalized class and mass actions. 6 Because practitioners generally
view federal courts as more hostile to class certification and mass
joinder, corporate tort reformers heralded CAFA as a victory, while
consumer advocates feared that it sounded the death knell for class
actions.2 7
This Article evaluates whether MMTJA and CAFA have, as
feared by plaintiffs, killed class and mass actions seeking monetary
damages. Although plaintiffs use these procedural devices to
adjudicate a wide variety of substantive issues and obtain various
types of relief,28 this Article focuses specifically on consumer class
actions and mass torts seeking damages based on state law.29  These
types of cases pose a significant economic threat to corporations
24. Multiparty Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 2002, 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2000 & Supp. V
2005) (expanding federal jurisdiction for certain large mass disasters); see infra Part tI.B.2.
25. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see infra Part II.B.3.
26. See Steven M. Puiszis, Developing Trends with the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,
40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 115, 115 (2006); Laura Offenbacher, Note, The Multiparty, Multiforum
Trial Jurisdiction Act: Opening the Door to Class Action Reform, 23 REV. LITIG. 177, 205-06
(2004).
27. See Dan Zegart, Tort "Reform " Triumphs, NATION, March 7, 2005, at 8.
28. Class and mass actions were first used in large-scale commercial litigation and securities
fraud actions. They became synonymous with civil rights after Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954). See Richard L. Marcus, Reassessing the Magnetic Pull of Megacases on
Procedure, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 459-64 (2001). Most recently, they have been associated
with the topic of this Article: consumer class actions and mass torts. Id.
29. Consumer class actions and mass torts involve practices by businesses that harm large
groups of individual consumers. Common types of cases include products liability actions,
companies that overcharge consumers, and fraudulent advertising. E.g., Amchem Prod. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (asbestos case); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prod. Liab.
Litig., 333 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003) (action by buyers and lessees of SUVs equipped with tires
that had an abnormally high failure rate against manufacturer); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84
F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (action by smokers and nicotine-dependent persons against tobacco
companies); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (products
liability suit against manufacturers of Agent Orange to recover for damages arising out of
Vietnam veterans' exposure); Ysbrand v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 2003 OK 17, 81 P.3d 618
(action by buyers for warranty and common law fraud claims regarding defective air bags
installed in minivans against manufacturers); Washington Mutual Bank FA v. Superior Court, 15
P.3d 1071 (Cal. 2001) (mortgagors action against bank for charging excessive amounts for
replacement hazard insurance when mortgagor defaulted on loan obligation to maintain
insurance).
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because they result in potentially debilitating judgments,3"
particularly in state court, where judges and juries tend to be more
plaintiff friendly.31 Therefore, reformers targeted their efforts on
keeping these types of class actions out of state court.32
Part II of this Article provides a history of class and mass action
federalization and the effects of recent legislation. Part III discusses
the role of forum selection in class and mass actions. Part IV
analyzes strategies to avoid federal jurisdiction under MMTJA and
CAFA. Finally, Part V provides some pointers on horizontal forum
shopping and other strategies to maintain a viable class or mass
action in federal court. The Article concludes in Part VI by
answering the question posed in the title: whether class and mass
actions are dead.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Changes:
Federalizing Class and Mass Actions
In the past decade, Congress has gradually federalized class and
mass actions. This trend can be explained by several factors. First,
reformers successfully convinced Congress that class and mass
actions hurt the economy by forcing corporate defendants to settle
frivolous suits. 33 Second, there was a general sentiment, perpetuated
by the Judicial Hellholes series,34 that state courts did not handle
complex actions appropriately.35 Reformers continually cited judicial
30. See Sherman, supra note 2, at 52 (citing Judge Posner's famous quote in In re Rhone-
Poulenc, 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995), about how class actions threaten businesses with
bankruptcy).
31. See generally AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2007 (2007), http://
www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/report.pdf (describing abuses by state courts). Reports for 2002
through 2006 are also available. For an interesting examination of Judicial Hellholes, see Adam
Feit, Developments, Tort Reform, One State at a Time: Recent Developments in Class Actions
and Complex Litigation in New York, Illinois, Texas, and Florida, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 899
(2008).
32. The controversy over CAFA arises from its jurisdictional provisions, which federalize
most class and mass actions. Therefore, it has little effect on federal question actions, which have
always been subject to removal if brought in state court.
33. Steven J. Shapiro, Applying the Jurisdictional Provisions of the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005: In Search of a Sensible Judicial Approach, 59 BAYLOR L. REv. 77, 78 (2007).
34. AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, supra note 31.
35. See Jonathan Weisman, Lawsuit Reform a Bush Priority, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2004, at
A6; see also Richard A. Oppel, Jr., House Expected to Pass Bill to Rewrite the Rules on Class-
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abuses in state court, such as enabling forum shopping, adopting
novel legal theories that were not supported by existing law,
improperly aggregating claims, permitting unnecessarily broad and
invasive discovery, allowing "junk science" to constitute evidence,
and giving biased jury instructions.36 Third, Congress did not like
plaintiff forum shopping and wanted to stop attorneys from "gaming
the system."37 This section briefly addresses the history of complex
litigation reform that culminated with CAFA's passage in 2005.
1. Securities
Modern class action reform began in 1995, when Congress
passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"), to
limit allegedly meritless securities litigation that was harming the
U.S. economy.38 This legislation heightened pleading standards,
limited fees and expenses available to class counsel, required
disclosure statements, and otherwise made it more difficult to bring a
securities class action in federal court. 9 Consequently, plaintiffs
avoided federal court and brought their actions under state securities
statutes.40  To counter this end run, Congress enacted SLUSA in
1998 to ensure that the majority of securities actions would be
litigated in federal court under the stricter standards of PSLRA"
Today, federal court is the primary forum for class actions involving
nationally traded securities.42
2. Multiparty Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002
Next, Congress passed the Multiparty Multiforum Trial
Jurisdiction Act ("MMTJA") of 2002. Unlike PSLRA, SLUSA, or
CAFA, this legislation passed quietly and without much fanfare or
Action Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2003, at A3 1. See generally AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N,
supra note3 1.
36. AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, supra note 31, at 1-2.
37. Shapiro, supra note 33, at 78.
38. Puiszis, supra note 26, at 115 n.2. Congress passed PSLRA over President Clinton's
veto. See Oppel, supra note 35, at A31 (noting that Congress overrode Bill Clinton's presidential
veto of PSLRA).
39. Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
40. Puiszis, supra note 26, at 116.
41. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
42. Puiszis, supra note 26, at 116.
970
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controversy.43 MMTJA was ostensibly enacted to promote the
consolidation of multiple individual cases arising from a common
disaster, such as an airline crash, a fire, or a train wreck." However,
some scholars point out that Congress went beyond the simple
"Lexecon fix," which would have allowed transferee judges in
multidistrict litigation to transfer cases to themselves for trial.45
Instead, Congress tested a "new species of diversity-based
jurisdiction" that opened the door to radical class action reform.46
This "new species of diversity-based jurisdiction" is minimal
diversity, which confers original federal court jurisdiction over an
action if one plaintiff is diverse from one defendant.47 Minimal
diversity is the constitutional minimum required for federal courts to
adjudicate actions based on state law.48 Nevertheless, Congress-
with a few exceptions 49-historically limited federal jurisdiction to
cases involving complete diversity, which requires all plaintiffs to be
diverse from all defendants.5"
Although MMTJA granted minimal jurisdiction over a very
narrowly defined group of mass accident cases,51 critics correctly
forecast that this new species of diversity jurisdiction-minimal
43. Offenbacher, supra note 26, at 177-78.
44. Kristine Cordier Kamezis, Annotations, Construction and Application of Multiparty
Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002 (MMTJA), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1369, 2006 A.L.R. FED. 2d.
21.
45. See Georgene Vairo, Legislation Update, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 16, 2002, at B7 [hereinafter
Legslation Update].
46. See id. (arguing that Congress abandoned the obvious solution to the consolidation
problem in favor of a more controversial solution that provides "expanded federal jurisdiction at
the expense of the state courts"); Offenbacher, supra note 26, at 205-07.
47. See Thomas J. McLaughlin & Adam N. Steinman, The Multiparty, Multiforum
Jurisdiction Act's Impact on Major Accident Litigation, BRIEF, Fall 2004, at 16, 17.
48. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967).
49. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (interpleader statute requires minimal
diversity).
50. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
51. MMTJA only applies to cases arising from a single accident where at least seventy-five
people have died at a discrete location. Moreover, one of the following three conditions must be
satisfied:
1. A defendant resides in a State and a substantial part of the accident took place in another
State or other location, regardless of whether that defendant is also a resident of the
State where a substantial part of the accident took place;
2. Any two defendants reside in different States, regardless of whether such defendants are
also residents of the same State or States; or
3. Substantial parts of the accident took place in different States.
28 U.S.C. § 1369.
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diversity-would eventually apply to nearly every interstate class
action.52
In addition to employing minimal diversity, MMTJA expanded
federal court jurisdiction further by amending 28 U.S.C. § 1441 to
permit liberal removal. 3 Defendants are not only allowed to remove
actions that qualify for original jurisdiction; they are also allowed to
remove any action that arises from the same incident. Thus,
MMTJA represented a tentative, and potentially unconstitutional,54
foray into radical complex litigation reform beyond Article III
jurisdiction.5
3. CAFA
Finally, on February 18, 2005, Congress threw open the doors of
the federal court and invited complex state litigants to enter. In
passing CAFA, Congress found that abuses of the class action device
undermined the national judicial system, interfered with the free flow
of interstate commerce, misconstrued the concept of diversity
jurisdiction as intended by the Framers, and enriched counsel at the
expense of class members. 6 Congress enacted CAFA to create
federal court jurisdiction over interstate cases with national
importance, assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members
with legitimate claims, and benefit the economy. 7
To pursue its first goal, Congress conferred federal diversity
jurisdiction over class actions where: (1) minimal diversity exists;58
52. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1) (2000).
53. See Angela J. Rafoth, Note, Congress and the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction
Act of 2002: Meaningful Reform or a Comedy of Errors?, 54 DUKE L.J. 255, 271-76 (2004)
(arguing that removal provisions are potentially unconstitutional).
54. See infra Part 1V.A.2.b (discussing potentially unconstitutional application of MMTJA).
55. Although the primary effect of MMTJA is to expand federal jurisdiction, it does contain
two provisions to limit jurisdiction. First, there is an abstention provision that mandates a court to
abstain from hearing an action where a "substantial majority of all plaintiffs" are citizens of the
same state in which the primary defendants are also citizens and the claims asserted would be
primarily governed by the laws of that state. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(b). Second, it contains a unique
"reverse removal" provision that provides courts the discretion to remand removed cases to their
original court for damage proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(2). The effect of this provision is to
allow plaintiffs to "retain their forum choice when the policy interest in providing a single forum
is weakest." Rafoth, supra note 53, at 270.
56. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a), 119 Stat. 4, 4-5 (2005).
57. Id. § 2(b).
58. Minimal diversity exists whenever:
(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any
defendant;
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and (2) the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. 9
This construction of diversity jurisdiction eviscerated the long-
standing rule for class actions that required complete diversity
between class representatives and defendants6" and required that each
class member individually satisfy the amount-in-controversy
requirement." Since most class actions meet these requirements, the
overwhelming majority are removable.62 Although the legislation
contains several exclusions and exceptions that are intended to keep
smaller local controversies in state court, as will be discussed in Part
IV.B.3, it is unclear whether this intent will be realized.63
In addition, CAFA's potential impact reaches far beyond
traditional "class" actions. CAFA not only expands federal
jurisdiction over class actions; it also applies to mass actions. For
the purposes of CAFA, a mass action is defined as any civil action in
which monetary-relief claims of 100 or more people are proposed to
be tried jointly on the ground that plaintiffs' claims involve common
questions of law or fact.64 In fact, CAFA's influence seems to be
spreading beyond its statutory parameters to multidistrict mass tort
litigation and even some nonaggregation cases.65
(B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a
foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; or
(C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any defendant is a
foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
59. Id.
60. Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 84 (2005).
61. Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1367, as recognized in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Sews. Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005). In
Exxon, the Supreme Court held that federal courts could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
class members who did not meet the minimum amount in controversy. However, Congress
enacted CAFA before the Court decided this case, so its aggregation requirement represented a
substantial departure from all prior precedent. Although minimal diversity had been used in the
interpleader and MMTJA statutes, CAFA was the first time that Congress allowed it to apply so
broadly.
62. Shapiro, supra note 33, at 81.
63. See Sarah Vance, A Primer on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 TUL. L. REV.
1617, 1621-27 (2006) (enumerating and explaining each exclusion and exception).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1 l)(B)(i).
65. See CAFA Law Blog, http://www.cafalawblog.com/-case-summaries-reach-of-cafa-
spreads-smoothly-like-pancake-batter-in-the-griddle.html (May 28, 2007, 5:23 CST) (discussing
nonclass case in which district court judge applied CAFA standards); CAFA Law Blog,
http://www.cafalawbiog.com/-case-summaries-the-united-states-district-court-for-the-ed-of-
pennsylvania-dreams-a-little-dream-suggesting-an-expansion-of-cafa-to-multidistrict-mass-tort-
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Furthermore, to pursue its second goal of protecting class
members, Congress included a "Class Action Bill of Rights," which
applies to all class actions filed under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 ("Rule 23"1).66 These provisions regulate attorneys'
fees when parties agree to a coupon settlement, bar settlements that
discriminate geographically, and limit money-losing settlements to
situations where the nonmonetary benefits to class members
substantially outweigh the monetary benefits.67 In addition, CAFA
imposes significant notice requirements on defendants who agree to
settle.6' Although a detailed analysis of these provisions is beyond
the scope of this Article, suffice it to say that the "Bill of Rights" has
an impact on forum selection and the central question of this Article:
whether class and mass actions are dead.69
B. Effects of PSLRA, SLUSA, MMTJA, and CAFA
Through its handiwork over the past decade, Congress
seemingly accomplished its goal of federalizing class and mass
action litigation. Overall, class action activity in federal diversity
cases has increased significantly since Congress enacted CAFA. The
most recent Federal Judicial Center Report on CAFA's effects
indicates that the average number of diversity class actions nearly
doubled from a pre-CAFA level of 27.0 cases per month to a post-
CAFA level of 53.4 cases per month. Surprisingly, original filings
have increased more than removals. 71  Although this may indicate
litigation.html (Feb. 21, 2007, 2:38 CST) (discussing multidistrict litigation ("MDL") case in
which judge suggested that Congress expand CAFA to include these actions).
66. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 3, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711-15 (2005).
67. See generally Edward A. Hosp, Settlements Under the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, 67 ALA. LAW. 125 (2006); Vance, supra note 63, at 1632-35; Lauren Walker, The
Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights: A Policy and Political Mistake, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 849
(2007).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1715.
69. See infra Parts C, E.
70. THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION
FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS 2 (2007), available at http://pubcit.typepad.
com/clpblog/files/cafapreliminaryreportiiifinal.pdf. However, the increase is not uniform. A
large percentage of this spike is concentrated in cases involving state law contract and fraud
claims. Although tort cases involving property damage have also increased, cases involving
personal injury claims have remained stagnant. One possible explanation for this anomaly is that
plaintiffs are choosing to file personal injury claims as mass actions rather than class actions. See
Quinton, supra note 6, at 44 (describing a strategy shift from class actions to mass actions).
71. WILLGING & LEE, supra note 70, at 2.
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that plaintiffs do not view federal courts as hostile, the more likely
explanation is that plaintiffs are preempting removal and controlling
forum selection by filing in a preferred federal circuit.
Regardless, CAFA clearly achieves its objective of federalizing
class and mass actions." What remains unclear are the following: (1)
whether there is a way to avoid the federalization of complex
litigation; and (2) whether federalization is, in fact, a bad thing for
plaintiffs. Specifically, is the federal docket so overloaded with
massive state law actions that civil rights and other federal question
class actions are denied access to the courts?" Are the overall
numbers of class and mass actions on the decline, indicating the
"death" of aggregated consumer litigation? The remainder of this
Article will address these controversial issues.
III. THE ROLE OF FORUM SELECTION IN CLASS AND
MASS ACTION LITIGATION
At its core, the controversy over class and mass action
federalization is a debate about forum selection. Federalization
deprives plaintiffs of their traditional right to strategically choose
whether to file in state or federal court when jurisdiction is proper in
both fora.74 Some may argue that this is a positive development
because forum shopping is bad. However, forum selection is merely
the process of choosing among various proper fora to resolve a
case.75 In fact, a recent study on attorney choice of fora in class
action litigation indicates that two of the three primary factors in
forum selection are source of law and state connections.76 The
72. But see infra note 450 and accompanying text (noting that the increased class action
activity in federal court involves contract and fraud cases, rather than the tort cases that reformers
had in mind when they pushed for the enactment of CAFA).
73. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 3, n. 10.
74. See Allan Kanner, Interpreting the Class Action Fairness Act in a Truly Fair Manner, 80
TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1650 (2006). It is worth noting that federalization only affects vertical forum
selection, which is implicated when there is concurrent jurisdiction. Class and mass action
litigants are still free to engage in horizontal forum selection, which is implicated when there is
proper jurisdiction in more than one state or district. See infra Part V; see also Justin D.
Forlenza, CAFA and Erie: Unconstitutional Consequences?, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1065, 1085
(2006).
75. Georgene M. Vairo, Is Selecting Shopping?, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 18, 2000, at A16.
76. Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class
Action Litigation: What Difference Does it Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 611 (2006).
"State connections" is the composite of the average percentage of in-state class members and the
percentage of in-state claims-related events. Id. at 610 tbl.1.
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prevalence of these factors indicates that class action attorneys are
generally not manipulating jurisdiction to "keep cases of national
importance out of Federal court."77  Rather, they are merely
following principles of federalism and maintaining local actions in
state courts.7 Moreover, even when plaintiffs' counsel chooses a
forum based on a perception of judges' predispositions, many
commentators characterize this decision as the fulfillment of an
attorney's ethical obligation, rather than an exercise in
manipulation.79
A well-known precept in the world of litigation is that forum
selection has a substantial effect on the outcome of a case."0 This
precept is particularly true in class and mass actions. A plaintiff or
class member's recovery often depends on successful joinder or class
certification because small claims are not economically viable unless
pursued collectively.8' However, joinder and certification rules grant
judges particularly wide discretion, increasing the likelihood that the
forum selected will ultimately determine the outcome of the case.82
For example, in the federal class action context, certification
often turns on the predominance and superiority requirements. As
one commentator noted, the predominance requirement is "in the eye
of the beholder," and the superiority requirement is necessarily
"bound up ... in a particular trial court's willingness to undertake
77. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(4)(A), 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
78. When a case is based on state law and has a high average of in-state class members and
in-state claims-related events, it properly belongs in state court. Shapiro, supra note 33, at 83.
Although CAFA provides exceptions to allow these actions to remain in state court, Congress
drafted them in a way that will make it very difficult for plaintiffs to use. See id. at 85; infra Part
IV.A.3.
79. See, e.g., Vairo, supra note 75, at A16; Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum
Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79 (1999).
80. See, e.g., Steven M. Pesner, Initial Considerations in the Litigation Process, in 584
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 17,
25 (1987).
81. See Burch, supra note 14, at 12. According to one empirical study, "[t]he dichotomy
between certified and noncertified cases could hardly be clearer." Willging & Wheatman, supra
note 76, at 649. A vast majority (89%) of certified cases concluded with court-approved
settlements, whereas 97% of uncertified classes were dismissed, settled on an individual basis, or
voluntarily dismissed. Id. at 649-50. The reason for this stark contrast is that the risk of
immense liability from an adverse class action judgment gives the class tremendous leverage over
the defendant. JoEllen Lind, "Procedural Swift": Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort Law,
and Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV. 717, 756 (2004). Therefore, rulings on certification
and joinder end up resolving the case in most instances.
82. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Mass Tort Class Actions, in ATLA'S LITIGATING TORT CASES §
9.3 (Roxanne Bartom Conlin & Gregory S. Cusimano eds. 2003).
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the management challenges presented by every class action. '"83
Although class litigants historically viewed federal court as the most
advantageous forum,84 that changed when the federal judiciary
decertified a number of classes in the 1990s because they failed the
predominance requirement, were too large to manage, or both.85
Today, most practitioners believe that state courts favor
plaintiffs and federal courts favor defendants in class and mass
actions seeking damages.8 6 This section analyzes the various reasons
for this perception, including: favorableness of procedural rules,
judicial predispositions, attorney convenience, and the cost of
litigation. It concludes with a cursory review of the empirical data
on whether forum selection is actually outcome determinative.
A. Favorable Procedural Rules
In the practical sense, procedural rules in federal court tend to
favor defendants and are often outcome determinative.87 Although a
comprehensive discussion of the distinctions between procedural
rules in federal and state court is beyond the scope of this Article,
two examples are illustrative. 8 First, a trio of Supreme Court cases
has made it much easier for defendants to obtain summary judgment
in federal court.89 In particular, these cases held that a defendant
83. Id.; see CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 5, §§ 4:21-:32 (describing predomnance and
superiority tests and application).
84. Lauren D. Fredricks, Developments, Removal, Remand, and Other Procedural Issues
Under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 995, 999 (2006).
85. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (decertifying an
asbestos settlement class because the predominance requirement under Rule 23(b)(3) and the
adequacy requirement under Rule 23(a)(4) were not met); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288
F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002) (decertifying a class injured by defective tires because it was
unmanageable as a nationwide class action or individual state class actions); Castano v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (decertifying a class of smokers and nicotine dependent
persons because the district court failed to consider how variations in state law would affect
predominance and superiority requirements).
86. See, e.g., Juliana Kreese & Benjamin C. Rosenbaum, The New Face of Class Action
Litigation: An Interview with Professor Tobias Barrington Wolff of UC Davis Law School, 6 U.C.
DAVIS Bus. L.J. 12 (2005).
87. Lind, supra note 81, at 717 (arguing that procedural changes in federal courts are
undermining substantive state law and producing "profoundly different outcomes in cases").
88. Other potential areas of distinction are the availability of interlocutory review, discovery
rules, and the availability of a jury trial. See, e.g., Gita F. Rothschild, Forum Shopping, 24 LITIG.
40, 41-42 (1998).
89. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (holding that when a court rules
on a motion for summary judgment, it should apply the evidentiary standard of proof applicable
at a trial on the merits); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (holding that a moving
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could support its motion for summary judgment by merely pointing
out that a plaintiff cannot meet an element of its claim, without
providing any affirmative evidence.9" In contrast, the plaintiff must
offer sufficient affirmative evidence to satisfy the burden of proof
that would apply at trial to survive defendant's motion for summary
judgment." Many state courts have repudiated, distinguished, and
limited the holdings of one or more of these cases.92 Thus, plaintiffs
face a disproportionate burden when opposing a motion for summary
judgment in federal court as compared to state court,93 making it
much more likely that their case will be dismissed in a federal forum.
Second, evidence rules in federal court make it much harder for
plaintiffs to challenge summary judgment. For example, in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , the Supreme Court held that
a trial judge could exclude unreliable expert testimony, instead of
allowing the jury to determine its evidentiary weight.95 In practice,
this decision excluded expert opinions critical to plaintiffs' cases,
thereby making motions for summary judgment that much easier to
obtain.96 Moreover, class opponents use Daubert to defeat motions
for class certification because many parties use experts to
demonstrate the viability of a class.97 Because many states have
repudiated or limited Daubert,98 there is a greater chance that a
plaintiff s case will be halted in federal court.
party need not support its motion with affidavits; rather, it is sufficient to point to absence of
support for nonmovant); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)
(allowing the judge to evaluate motive on a motion for summary judgment).
90. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-27.
91. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250.
92. Lind, supra note 81, at 769-70. One particularly noteworthy state is Oregon, which has
rejected all three decisions. Id. at 771.
93. According to FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c), the nonmovant must produce some evidence beyond
the pleadings to survive the motion. This burden falls more heavily on plaintiffs because they
bear the burden of proof at trial. Moreover, there are meritorious cases in which plaintiffs may
not be able to meet this burden due to the nature of proof, such as conspiracy cases. See Lind,
supra note 81, at 767.
94. 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
95. Id. at 589.
96. After this decision, "Daubert hearings" proliferated, during which the trial judge tested
the admissibility of expert testimony. Generally, these hearings are conducted early in the
litigation and exclude the expert testimony evidence necessary to demonstrate a "genuine issue of
material fact." Lind, supra note 81, at 772.
97. Id. at 774.
98. Id. at 773.
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B. Predisposition of Judges
Despite differences in procedural rules between the federal and
state court systems, states largely follow Rule 23"9 for class
certification. However, Rule 23 permits broad discretion, which
results in non-uniform application."' In the 1990s, many circuit
courts rejected and even decertified classes, while state courts
certified classes with similar facts. 1' As a result, the view that
federal courts kill class actions proliferated.
1 2
Class certification is not the only area where a judge may
exercise considerable discretion. Judges decide how broadly to
construe discovery and evidentiary rules, whether to permit joinder
and consolidation, which jury instructions to approve, and whether to
entertain novel legal theories.0 3 All of these decisions have a
profound impact on a class or mass action litigant's ability to obtain
relief.
C. PlaintiffAttorneys Prefer State Court Because
It Is More Convenient and Economical
Plaintiffs' attorneys also bemoan federalization because it
precludes them from practicing in the forum that is most familiar and
convenient.0 4 Compared to defense counsel, plaintiffs' attorneys are
99. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
100. Victor E. Schwartz, et. al., Guide to Multistate Litigation §2:3 (1985).
101. See JEFFREY I. LANG & DEBRA TODRES, SEVERAL FUNNY THINGS HAPPENED ON THE
WAY TO THE CLASS ACTION FORUM: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS THAT MAY AFFECT THE CHOICE
OF FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 6 (discussing state certification of nationwide classes).
But see id. at 6-7 (discussing state reluctance to certify nationwide classes).
102. See Willging & Wheatman, supra note 76, at 625 tbl.6 (75% of defendant attorneys who
removed cases to federal court reported that they believed federal judges were more likely than
state judges to rule in favor of their clients).
103. See generally AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, supra note 31, at 1-2; Victor E. Schwartz,
Leah Lorber & Rochelle M. Tedesco, Taking a Stand Against Lawlessness in American Courts:
How Trial Court Judges and Appellate Justices Can Protect Their Courts from Becoming
Judicial Hellholes, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 215 (2003).
104. See Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under
Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 402 (1992). According to
this empirical survey, the most important forum selection factor for plaintiffs is attorney
convenience. Plaintiffs tend to prefer state court because it is more geographically convenient,
more familiar, and lacks the burdensome pretrial requirements of federal court. Id; see also
Willging & Wheatman, supra note 76, at 613-15 (discussing attorney convenience and
geographic convenience of court).
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less likely to be litigators and are less experienced in federal court." 5
Less experienced litigators gravitate towards state court, presumably
because state court is viewed as more hospitable. 6 Moreover,
attorneys predictably prefer to file where they have the most
experience, which is usually in state court."7 By filing in a familiar
forum, they have the advantage of already understanding the court
rules and having relationships with the judges and their clerks." 8
Moreover, if an attorney has cultivated a particularly good reputation
in a forum, then the judge is more likely to use its discretion in favor
of the attorney's client.0 9
Plaintiffs' attorneys have another practical reason to favor state
court: costs of litigation. Practitioners generally agree that federal
court is more expensive due to the rules, which tend to be more
formal."0 Because they represent individuals, plaintiffs' attorneys
usually have fewer resources than defense counsel, who often
represent corporations."' Therefore, plaintiffs prefer state court to
keep the costs of litigation down.
D. Is Perception Reality?
As discussed above, a widespread belief exists that federal court
is an unfavorable forum for plaintiffs pursuing class or mass actions
based on state law. At least one empirical study suggests that this
perception is reality."2  According to this study, plaintiffs have a
substantially lower chance of prevailing when a case is removed
105. Miller, supra note 104, at 402 (reporting that 81% of plaintiff attorneys are litigators,
compared to 95% for defense counsel; and 10% of plaintiff attorneys practice in federal court,
while 44% of defense counsel had a federal court litigation practice).
106. Id. For example, some plaintiff attorneys believe that federal courts are more sterile
because federal judges typically make decisions based on the writings and do not entertain oral
advocacy. See, e.g., Interview with Paul R. Kiesel, Partner, Kiesel, Boucher & Larson LLP, in
Beverly Hills, Cal. (Sept. 25, 2007).
107. According to one empirical study, only 10% of plaintiff attorneys practice in federal
court, compared to 44% of defendants. Miller, supra note 104, at 402.
108. Telephone Interview with Kimberly A. Kralowec, Of Counsel, The Furth Firm LLP, in
San Francisco, Cal. (Sept. 21, 2007).
109. See supra Part II.B.
110. See Miller, supra note 104, at 404; Gina Passarella, Ruling Shows Potential Pitfalls for
Some Discovery Tactics, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 5, 2007, at 3.
111. Miller, supra note 104, at 402.
112. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal
Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
581,593 (1998).
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from state court than when a plaintiff chooses federal court."3
Although the researchers recognize that "case selection" '14 may
explain the large removal effect, they ultimately conclude that forum
selection does have a substantial effect on outcomes. "5 In fact, the
data suggests that the removal effect may be even greater than
attorneys recognize."
6
However, a recent study by the Federal Judicial Center
regarding class action rulings indicates that the forum impact is
overstated."7 According to this study, federal and state judges are
equally likely to certify classes, equally likely to approve
settlements, and do not differ significantly in their rulings on
dispositive motions."8 However, the study did pick up on two
statistically significant differences. First, federal judges were more
likely to deny certification, while state judges were more likely to
take no action on certification." 9 This wrinkle explains why both
forums certified classes at the same rate, even though federal courts
denied certification at a greater rate. It is worth noting that
defendants may choose to settle after remand, rather than continue
litigating in what they consider to be a biased forum, thus depressing
state court class certification numbers.
Second, the Center's study found that state courts certified larger
settlements. 2 ° This discrepancy was a function of class size as
federal courts actually awarded class members more money per
person than state courts.' 2' Nevertheless, this difference is important
113. Overall win rate in federal civil cases is 57.97%, whereas removal win rate is 36.77%.
Id.
114. Case selection occurs when cases that are chosen for removal are weaker than those that
are originally filed in federal court. Id. at 602.
115. Id. at 602-07.
116. Id. at 602.
117. See Willging & Wheatman, supra note 76, at 653. However, the study did indicate two
interesting variances: (1) removal rates are much higher in Illinois, indicating that Illinois state
judges are more receptive to class members; and (2) removal rates are significantly lower in New
York, indicating that New York state judges are significantly less receptive to class members. Id.
at 633.
118. Id. at 599.
119. Id. at635.
120. Id. at 639. In cases removed to federal court and remanded to state court, classes
recovered a median amount of $850,000, whereas classes only received $300,000 when the case
was removed and not remanded. Id. tbl. 15.
121. Id. (median recovery per class member in cases removed to federal court and remanded
to state court was $350, whereas median recovery in cases removed to federal court and not
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because it indicates that state courts certify larger classes, which
means larger potential judgments and more attorneys' fees.'22
Although the empirical studies conflict, it is likely that forum
selection does have some affect on outcomes.
IV. How TO STAY IN STATE COURT AFTER MMTJA AND CAFA
As discussed above, class and mass action plaintiffs have good
reasons to prefer state court. The purpose of this section is to
analyze strategies that will allow plaintiffs to maintain their actions
in state court. Contrary to popular belief, CAFA was not designed to
federalize all class and mass actions.123 Congress reserved smaller
local controversies for state court but failed to draft the legislation in
a way that makes that goal easily achievable.'24 Part A discusses
MMTJA and the subsequent case law interpreting its provisions,
which provides critical precedent for CAFA cases. Part B discusses
CAFA and how courts have interpreted its provisions.
A. MMTJA: Mass Disaster Scenarios
Without much fanfare, Congress enacted the Multiparty
Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act MMTJA in 2003 as part of an
omnibus Justice Department appropriations bill.2 5 MMTJA breezed
through Congress because of its narrow scope and purely procedural
justification. 26  Since the 1970s, Congress had considered federal
consolidation of catastrophic single-accident cases to increase
efficiency and promote fairness. 127  Consolidation advances these
goals by reducing duplicative liability determinations and ensuring
consistent results. 12  Therefore, MMTJA slipped past the radar of
remanded was $517).
122. Id. at 639-40 (noting that the typical recovery per class member in federal courts was
almost 50% higher than in state courts).
123. Shapiro, supra note 33, at 83.
124. Id. at 85-86.
125. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002).
126. See Legislation Update, supra note 46.
127. Joseph M. Creed, Note, Choice of Law Under the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial
Jurisdiction Act of 2002, 17 REGENT U. L. REv. 157, 168 (2004). For a comprehensive review of
MMTJA's legislative history, see id. at 167-72.
128. Id. at 171.
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most people, even though it was a critical victory in the movement to
federalize class and mass actions.
One scholar analogized MMTJA to a vacuum cleaner that can
"suck up all of the cases . . . and deposit them in [a] federal
court .... 29 Section 136930 authorizes federal courts to hear cases
in three ways. 3' First, the statute grants original jurisdiction when
there is minimal diversity between adverse parties and the action
arises from a "single accident, where at least 75 natural persons have
died in the accident at a discrete location .... In addition, the
action must satisfy one of three dispersion qualifiers,1 3  which limit
MMTJA application to actions that have the potential to be brought
in scattered jurisdictions. 134  Second, a defendant can remove an
action to federal court if either the action could have been brought
under § 1369 or if the defendant is a party to an action that is or
could have been brought under § 1369 and the action arises from the
same accident that is pending in state court (even if the state court
action does not have jurisdiction on its own).135 Third, a plaintiff can
intervene in an action pending in district court if the action was or
could have been brought under § 1369, even if the plaintiff could not
have brought the action in federal court as an original matter.
36
129. Peter Adomeit, The Station Nightclub Fire and Federal Jurisdictional Reach: The
Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 2002, 25 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 243, 247
(2003).
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2000).
131. See Creed, supra note 127, at 174.
132. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a). Once this threshold is met, the statute creates jurisdiction over
personal injury and collateral property damage claims, in addition to wrongful death actions. See
Adomeit, supra note 129, at 248-49 (explicating § 1369(c)(3)).
133. Section 1369(a) states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction.. . if-
(1) a defendant resides in a State and a substantial part of the accident took place in
another State or other location, regardless of whether that defendant is also a resident
of the State where a substantial part of the accident took place;
(2) any two defendants reside in different States, regardless of whether such defendants
are also residents of the same State or States; or
(3) substantial parts of the accident took place in different States.
28 U.S.C. § 1369(a).
134. See McLaughlin & Steinman, supra note 47, at 18; Offenbacher, supra note 26, at 192-
93.
135. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1).
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(d). For an interesting discussion of how the intervention provision can
be used to circumvent the abstention provisions in order to keep a case in federal court, see
Rafoth, supra note 53, at 268.
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Although the scope of § 1369 is already narrowly tailored,'37
both Congress and the courts limited its application even further by
creating an abstention provision that excepted truly local mass
disaster scenarios from federal jurisdiction. 3  The provision is
applicable when a "substantial majority" of all plaintiffs and
"primary defendants" are citizens of the same state and the law of
that state primarily governs.' Another limitation, recognized by at
least one court, is that MMTJA does not apply to cases that are likely
to be brought in a single forum because the legislative purpose to
avoid duplicative judgments and inconsistent awards is not
implicated in these suits.4
In addition to its jurisdictional provisions, MMTJA confers
procedural benefits on consolidated federal court actions, 4' such as
nationwide service of process,'42 subpoena authority,'43 and the
elimination of personal jurisdiction as a restriction on venue.'44
Combined with the consolidation advantages available in federal
court, these procedural incentives may cause plaintiffs to prefer
federal court.'45 In that case, plaintiffs will not have a problem
securing their chosen forum because MMTJA broadens federal
jurisdiction and liberalizes removal.
However, plaintiffs who want to litigate in state court will have
a difficult time keeping their cases in their chosen forum. To do so,
they must first demonstrate that their action could not have been
137. Only the most catastrophic accidents will cause the death of seventy-five people in a
discrete location.
138. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(b).
139. Id.
140. See Southall v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.06-3848, 2006 WL 2385365, at
*6 (E.D. La. Aug. 16, 2006). In an action filed by a husband and wife against their insurer for
property damage incurred during Hurricane Katrina, the court reasoned, "There is no indication
that the adjudication of this suit in a state court forum would lead to inconsistent awards with
suits in other fora." Id.; see also S. Athletic Club, LLC v. Hanover Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.06-2605,
2006 WL 2583406, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 6, 2006) ("The narrow jurisdiction under the MMTJA is
not intended to apply to a case where there are not many plaintiffs and many defendants.").
141. This is similar to the interpleader statute, which confers procedural benefits while
permitting minimal diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (2000).
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1697 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
143. 28 U.S.C. § 1785 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
144. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(g). See Rafoth, supra note 53, at 284.
145. See McLaughlin & Steinman, supra note 47, at 20.
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brought under § 1369 and second, that supplemental jurisdiction does
not exist under § 1441(e)(1)(B).'
46
1. Establishing that an action cannot be brought
under § 1369
There are two ways to establish that an action cannot be brought
in district court under § 1369: (1) by demonstrating that the action is
outside the scope of MMTJA; or (2) by demonstrating that the
abstention provisions apply. As in all civil actions, the party seeking
removal under MMTJA has the burden to make a prima facie
showing that facts exist to support federal court jurisdiction.
147
Therefore, this burden falls on the defendants when plaintiffs file in
state court.
Once defendants establish jurisdiction, however, the burden
shifts to plaintiffs to prove that the abstention provision applies.
48
The characterization of this provision as a mandatory abstention,
rather than a jurisdictional condition, is important. 149  Under the
abstention doctrine, the opponent of federal jurisdiction has the
burden of proving that the provision applies, 5° and a remand order is
subject to appellate review.15 On the other hand, under the
jurisdictional condition theory, the proponent of federal jurisdiction
146. Under § 1441(e)(1), an action may be removed if it (1) could have been brought in
federal court under § 1369; or (2) if the defendant is a party to an action which is or could have
been brought in federal court under § 1369, and if the case arises from the same accident as the
action in state court.
147. Case v. ANPAC La. Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 781, 795 (E.D. La. 2006).
148. See Passa v. Derderian, 308 F. Supp.2d 43, 58 (D.R.I. 2004) (holding that the plain
language of the statute and legislative history indicate that § 1369(b) is a mandatory abstention
provision).
149. Id. Unlike a jurisdictional condition, an abstention implies that federal court jurisdiction
exists, but the court must abstain from hearing the matter for policy reasons. Id. at 56.
150. Although no court has ever explicitly assigned the burden of proof for this provision, the
party advocating abstention usually has the burden of proof. See id. at 55 (noting that the
proponent of abstention has the burden of proving the applicability of the mandatory abstention
clause contained in the Bankruptcy Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2)). Moreover, under CAFA, the
proponent of state court adjudication has the burden of proving that an exception applies. See
infra note 221 and accompanying text. Although the statutes are worded slightly differently
(MMTJA uses the word "abstain" while CAFA uses the word "decline"), the legal analysis is the
same because courts have determined that the CAFA exceptions are also not jurisdictional. See
infra note 221 and accompanying text. Therefore, the burden of proof is likely on the proponent
of abstention.
151. See Wallace v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 444 F.3d 697, 700 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding
that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) does not apply to abstention-based remand orders because they are not
based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
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has the burden of proving that the condition does not apply,'52 and a
remand order is not subject to review.'53 Because it is easier for a
party to prevail when it does not bear the burden of proof, a plaintiff
will be more successful if it argues that § 1369 does not confer
jurisdiction, rather than advocating that the abstention provisions
should apply.'54
a. MMTJA does not apply
For an action to fall within the parameters of MMTJA, there
must be: (1) a single accident that caused the death of seventy-five
people at a discrete location; (2) minimal diversity between adverse
parties; and (3) the existence of at least one dispersion qualifier. 5 '
The most effective way to demonstrate that an action is outside the
scope of MMTJA is to argue that an event is not an accident under
the statute or that it did not cause the death of seventy-five people at
a discrete location.'56 The definition of accident in the statute is
ambiguous. According to the statute, it is "a sudden accident, or a
natural event culminating in an accident ... .""'
152. Passa, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 55 ("[B]urden of proof in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is always on
the party asserting federal jurisdiction.").
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) states, "An order remanding a case to the State court from which it
was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise .. "
154. Case v. ANPAC Louisiana Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. La. 2006), is a good
example of this principle. This action involved pendent property damage claims incurred as a
result of Hurricane Katrina. Id. at 783. Because the defendant removed the case, it bore the
burden of establishing that seventy-five deaths occurred at a discrete location in a single accident.
Id. at 789. To meet its burden, defendant had to provide some evidence that seventy-five people
died at a discrete location as a result of the same levee breach that caused the property damage.
Id. at 792-93. Under the circumstances of Hurricane Katrina, it is nearly impossible to determine
the location and cause of a person's death, so the defendant will almost certainly fail to meet its
burden. Id. at 797.
155. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a).
156. Minimal diversity and its attendant qualifiers are generally not worth contesting because
they will almost always be satisfied. Minimal diversity exists when one party is a citizen of a
state and the other party is a citizen of different state, a foreign state, or a citizen of a foreign
state. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(c)(1). In a mass accident scenario with widespread injury and damage, it
is extremely unlikely that no minimal diversity will exist. Although the statute qualifies the
application of minimal diversity with dispersion requirements, those are easily met. For example,
the first qualifier is that a "defendant resides in a State and a substantial part of the accident
[takes] place in another State or other location, regardless of whether that defendant is also a
resident of the State where a substantial part of the accident took place." § 1369(a)(1). Since
most defendants in these cases will be major corporations that have citizenship in more than one
state, this condition will almost always be satisfied. See McLaughlin & Steinman, supra note 47,
at 18.
157. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(c)(4).
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On one hand, the term "accident" is fairly inclusive. Courts
have expanded the application of MMTJA beyond airline disasters,
which were the focus of its legislative history.158 For example, in
Passa v. Derderian,159 the District Court of Rhode Island applied
MMTJA to a nightclub fire accident and retained jurisdiction. 6 '
Moreover, although courts have not had the opportunity to determine
whether criminal or terrorist acts qualify as accidents, scholars
suggest that they would fall within the scope of MMTJA because the
defendant's intent is irrelevant to the goals of avoiding duplicative
and inconsistent litigation. 6'
On the other hand, Congress and courts have narrowly construed
the term "accident" in the context of MMTJA. The act's legislative
history indicates that Congress did not intend for it to apply to
multiple suits arising from multiple events, such as products liability
or toxic tort actions.'62 Moreover, courts have refused to extend the
definition of "accident" to natural events. In Case v. ANPAC
Louisiana Insurance Company,'63 the court held that Hurricane
Katrina was not an accident but rather a natural event that culminated
in multiple accidents (multiple levee breaches)." 4 Since § 1369
requires identification of a single accident, the deaths that resulted
from multiple breaches could not be aggregated to satisfy threshold
158. See Passa v. Derderian, 308 F. Supp.2d 43, 54 (D.R.I. 2004) (holding that MMTJA is not
limited to airline disasters, but applies to all qualifying tragedies resulting in the death of seventy-
five or more natural persons).
159. 308 F. Supp.2d 43 (D.R.I. 2004).
160. Id. at 54. This case arose out of the fourth worst nightclub fire in American history,
which resulted in 100 deaths and injured nearly 190 people. See id.; see also Adomeit, supra note
129.
161. See Rafoth, supra note 53, at 262-63.
162. H.R. REP. No. 102-373, at 6-7 (1991). However, MMTJA may apply to products
liability or toxic tort cases when all the claims arise from a single incident. E.g., In re Union
Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 1987). On the night of December
2-3, 1984, winds blew deadly gas from an industrial plant in India into densely occupied parts of
the city of Bhopal, causing over 2000 deaths and 200,000 injuries. Id.
163. 466 F. Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. La. 2006).
164. Id. at 793-95. The court rejected defendants' contention that the breaches were "one
accident" because they occurred along one levee system, reasoning that this broad reading would
not fulfill MMTJA's purpose of consolidating multiple actions with identical issues of liability
and causation. Id. Each levee breach presented a separate and distinct liability and causation
determination. Id. at 794.
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jurisdictional questions. 165 Consequently, the case was remanded to
state court.
66
A related issue with MMTJA is whether the accident resulted in
seventy-five deaths at a discrete location. The term "discrete
location" is ambiguous because it is not defined in the statute, and
there is no legislative history that indicates Congress's intentions.
167
Courts interpret the statute as requiring both the accident and the
deaths to occur at a discrete location.1
68
Further, courts have construed "location" narrowly. For
example, the Eastern District Court of Louisiana held that the
metropolitan area of New Orleans is not a discrete location. 169 The
same court held that "discrete location" should not be evaluated in
terms of physical boundaries, but according to common facts of
liability and causation.'70 Under this construction, the court held that
an incident involving multiple levee breaches and widespread
damage is not the kind of accident contemplated by the drafters of
MMTJA. 7'
To recap, a catastrophic fire, airplane disaster, or massive
building collapse is likely to qualify for federal jurisdiction because
both the event and the deaths will most likely occur in the same
discrete location. However, any natural disaster, toxic tort, or
products liability action is unlikely to fall within § 1369 jurisdiction
and will remain in state court. In these cases, a plaintiffs best bet is
to demonstrate that the abstention provision applies.
b. Pleading the application of§ 1369(b)
Congress included § 1369(b) to ensure that truly local actions
remain in state court.'72 Since its enactment, the abstention provision
165. Id. at 793-95.
166. Id. at 798.
167. Id. at 795-96.
168. Id. at 796. Although no court has addressed this precise issue, one court faced a situation
involving an accident that occurred in a different location from the deaths. See id. at 796 n.24
(discussing Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem '1 Med. Ctr., Inc., 463 F. Supp. 2d 583 (E.D. La.
2006)).
169. See Preston, 463 F. Supp. 2d at 591.
170. Case, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 797.
171. Id. at 798.
172. See Offenbacher, supra note 26, at 199.
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has been criticized as vague and poorly drafted.'73 Specifically, the
terms "substantial majority of all plaintiffs," "primary defendants,"
and "primarily governing law" are open to interpretation. The rest of
this Part considers judicial interpretations of these ambiguous terms
and whether litigators can employ pleading strategies to retain their
choice of forum.
i. Substantial majority of all plaintiffs
The phrase "substantial majority of all plaintiffs" is ambiguous
in two ways. First, "all plaintiffs" could refer to: (1) all plaintiffs
that have filed suit; or (2) all potential plaintiffs. 74 The court in
Passa chose the latter, holding that this phrase included "all potential
plaintiffs, meaning all those who have died or suffered injury as a
result of the tragedy at issue." '75 The court reasoned that a more
narrow construction would not serve Congress's intent because it
would result in dispersed suits. 76 The Passa court believed that if it
chose the first interpretation (referring to all plaintiffs that have filed
suit), federal courts would have to remand some cases under the
abstention provision and hear others arising from the same accident,
resulting in the inconsistency and inefficiency that MMTJA was
supposed to prevent.
77
Second, "substantial majority" can be construed as "virtually all
plaintiffs" or merely "more potential plaintiffs ... than any other one
state.' 1 78 In Passa, the court took the middle road and held that
"substantial majority" is a number that is more than a relative
majority (the latter), but less than "virtually all" (the former); it is
somewhat in excess of 50 percent, such as "two-thirds or three-
fourths.' 1 79  For example, in Passa, 44.18 percent of the potential
plaintiffs resided in Rhode Island.8 ' Although the number of Rhode
Island residents was more than double the number of plaintiffs from
173. See Rafoth, supra note 53, at 264.
174. Passa v. Derderian, 308 F. Supp.2d 43, 59 (D.R.I. 2004).
175. Id. at 60.
176. Id. at 59-60.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 60.
179. Id. at 61.
180. Id. at 60 (noting that 34.33% were from an unknown residence, 17.01% from
Massachusetts, 2.69% from Connecticut, 0.60% from California, 0.30% from Florida, Maine,
Nevada, and Ohio).
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any other single state, the court declined to find a substantial
majority because Rhode Island residents failed to comprise more
than 50 percent of the whole-much less a substantial majority.
181
ii. Primary defendants
"Primary defendants" is another ambiguous term, which
reappears in the CAFA exceptions. 82  At least three different
definitions of this term have been suggested: (1) defendants with the
deepest pockets; (2) defendants who are most culpable for the
accident; or (3) defendants who are directly, rather than vicariously,
liable.8 3 In Passa, the court adopted the third definition, reasoning
that it was the most workable and well supported by precedent in
other contexts. 1
84
One unresolved issue is whether a jurisdictional analysis of
"primary defendants" must include all liable parties or only the
defendants that are before the court. For example, if 75 percent of
potential plaintiffs are from New York, one of the primary
defendants is also from New York, and another primary defendant is
from California, can the plaintiffs sue only the in-state defendant to
remain in state court?
On one hand, considering all potential primary defendants is
important because failing to do so could result in scattered
litigation. 8 5  For example, if one group of plaintiffs in the
hypothetical above could sue the New York defendant and remain in
state court while another group of plaintiffs that sued both defendants
remained in federal court, litigation would be scattered. But, on the
other hand, considering non-named potential defendants infringes the
plaintiff-choice principle. 86 Therefore, this may be an area where a
plaintiffs lawyer can strategically build a case to maintain his or her
forum choice.
181. Id. at 61.
182. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2), (d)(4) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
183. Passa, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 61-63.
184. Id. at62.
185. Id.
186. See Antony L. Ryan, Principles of Forum Selection, 103 W. VA. L. REv. 167, 168-69
(2000).
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iii. Primarily governing law
No court has explicated the meaning of "primarily governing
law." However, one commentator suggested that it should be
defined similarly to "substantial majority" because Congress used
both phrases with the intent of maintaining intrastate actions in state
court.'87 If this definition is adopted, federal courts must abstain
from hearing actions when substantially more than 50 percent of
claims are based on state law.'88
2. Supplemental jurisdiction does not exist
under § 1441(e)(1)
Even if plaintiffs cannot bring an action in federal court as an
original matter, a defendant may remove the action if it is party to an
action that was (or could have been) brought in federal court under §
1369 and both actions arise from the same accident.'89 For example,
in Wallace v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation,9 '
a class of claimants that incurred flood damage during Hurricane
Katrina sued their insurers in state court.'9' The defendants removed,
and the district court remanded, holding that the abstention provision
prevented it from hearing the action.'92 Nevertheless, on appeal, the
Fifth Circuit held that removal was proper because the defendant
insurers were also parties to a pending class action in federal court
that arose out of Hurricane Katrina and could have been brought
under § 1369.'9 Although subsequent decisions by lower courts
repudiated the characterization of Hurricane Katrina as an accident
under § 1369,' the holding of the case is unmistakable: an action
may be removed even if there is no independent federal court
jurisdiction.'95 This sweeping removal provision can be avoided by
187. See Offenbacher, supra note 26, at 203.
188. See id.
189. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1) (2000).
190. 444 F.3d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 2006).
191. Id. at 701.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 702.
194. See, e.g., Case v. ANPAC La. Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. La. 2006) (finding that
Hurricane Katrina is not an accident; it is a natural event that caused multiple accidents; and that
each levee breach constitutes a separate accident).
195. Wallace, 444 F.3d at 702.
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either: (1) distinguishing the accidents; or (2) contesting the
constitutionality of the provision.
a.. Distinguishing accidents
Section 1441(e)(1)(B) only applies when "an action which is or
could have been brought, in whole or in part, under section 1369 in a
United States district court . . . , arises from the same accident as the
action in State court ....""' To conceptualize the application of this
provision, consider the following hypothetical based on the
Hurricane Katrina litigation:'97 Plaintiff-claimant sues defendant-
insurer to compensate her for property damage caused by levee
breach A, which occurred as a result of the hurricane. Defendant is
also a party in federal court to another action, which is under § 1369
and based on damages arising from levee breach B-also caused by
the hurricane. Assuming the case arising out of breach A could not
be brought under § 1369, removal would be improper under §
1441(e)(1)(B). Although both cases arise from Hurricane Katrina, it
is not an accident. The individual breaches are the accidents.
Therefore, breach A is a different accident from breach B. 9 '
However, if the pending federal action arose out of multiple
levee breaches-breaches A, B, and C-and the defendant was liable
for the claims arising out of breach A (amongst others), then removal
would be proper because the federal court action arises in part from
196. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1)(B) (2000) (emphasis added).
197. The Hurricane Katrina cases interpreting § 1441(e)(1)(B) are confusing. In Plant
Gallery v. Hanover Insurance Company, the court held that removal was improper, even though
the defendant was a party to a case that could have been brought under § 1369, because plaintiffs
in the removed action did not allege damages arising from a levee breach, which was the accident
that formed the basis of § 1369 jurisdiction for the related action. Plant Gallery v. Hanover Ins.
Co., No. CIV.A.06-7692, 2007 WL 128831, at *3, (E.D. La. Jan. 17, 2007). In another case, the
court refused to apply this provision because the removed action was not based on a single
accident. See Case, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 794. In that case, the court held that the related action
could be based on multiple accidents, but the removed action had to be based on a single accident.
Id. It was unclear why the court read the statute in this manner, when the plain language does not
indicate that the damages must arise from a single accident under these circumstances. To
simplify the application of the rule, I have used a hypothetical instead of actual cases.
198. No case has dealt with this issue specifically. In most of the cases, the removed actions
are premised on wind damage from Hurricane Katrina, which does not qualify as an accident at
all. See, e.g., Racca v. La. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.06-6645, 2006 WL 3905004,
at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 8, 2006). Case is the only case that dealt with a removed action that arose
out of an accident. In that case, the plaintiffs did not allege damages that arose out of a different
accident from the related action; they failed to specify a single accident at all. See Case 466 F.
Supp. 2d at 794-95.
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the same accident.'99 Of course, breach A must have independently
resulted in seventy-five deaths at a discrete location to qualify for §
1369 jurisdiction, even though it is included in a multi-accident
action.
In short, this provision is complex, and courts have not
sufficiently clarified its meaning. In practice, it will be possible to
distinguish accidents when a natural disaster causes multiple
accidents, like in a hurricane or a massive earthquake. However,
when the disaster is a single accident, like an airplane crash,
nightclub fire, or train wreck, this strategy will not be available.
b. Contesting the constitutionality of
§ 1441 (e)(1)(B)
Another way to avoid supplemental jurisdiction is to challenge
the constitutionality of the section."0 The Constitution requires
minimal diversity for a federal court to have jurisdiction over state
law actions.2 ' However, § 1441(e)(1)(B) could result in federal
adjudication of non-diverse state law actions. For example, suppose
a defendant removes a non-diverse, state-law-based action under §
1441(e)(1)(B) to the federal court in the district where it was filed. 2
If this is not the same court where the related case with original §
1369 jurisdiction is pending, then no subject matter jurisdiction
exists, unless it is consolidated with the minimally diverse case. 3
However, it is not procedurally possible to consolidate the cases
because a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction lacks the authority
to transfer a case."° Although § 1631 permits a transfer to cure want
of jurisdiction, this solution only applies when the removed action
199. See Case, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 793 (assuming that § 1369 jurisdiction is available even
though an action involves multiple accidents).
200. See Rafoth, supra note 53, at 271-76 ("[T]he specific drafting of section 1441(e)...
may present some Article III hurdles to implementation.").
201. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
202. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) ("A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action or
criminal prosecution from a State court shall file in the district court of the United States for the
district and division within which such action is pending a notice of removal .... ").
203. If the removed case is consolidated with the related federal case, minimal diversity will
exist because the federal case is minimally diverse. Minimal diversity only requires that one
plaintiff is diverse from one defendant, so consolidation with a non-diverse state action will not
destroy jurisdiction. However, if the removed case is not consolidated, then no basis for federal
jurisdiction exists.
204. Rafoth, supra note 53, at 273 n.77.
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could have been brought in one of the district courts.2"5 Since a non-
diverse state law action could not have been brought as an original
matter in any district court, the section is unconstitutional as
applied. 6 However, this drafting problem could be remedied easily
by requiring removal to the court where the related federal action is
pending. 7 Because Congress will most likely remedy the drafting
error if a constitutional claim is brought, this argument will not go a
long way in helping plaintiffs keep their cases in state court.
3. MMTJA Wrap-Up
The bottom line under MMTJA is that most actions arising from
single-accident disasters will be litigated in federal court. To analyze
a mass accident action, the first step is to determine whether it falls
within the scope of § 1369. Any airline crash, train wreck, or hotel
fire that results in more than seventy-five deaths will almost certainly
qualify because it is highly likely that at least one plaintiff will be
diverse from a defendant. However, actions arising out of a natural
disaster will generally not qualify, unless it causes an identifiable
single accident that meets the threshold requirements.2 8 If the action
did not arise out of a single accident that resulted in seventy-five
natural deaths in a discrete location, then neither § 1369 nor §
1441(e)(1) will apply, and the action will remain in state court.20 9
If an action does fall within the scope of MMTJA, the next step
is to determine whether the abstention provision applies. Because
the provision has been narrowly construed, it will only apply in rare
205. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2000) ("[T]he court shall, if it is in the interest ofjustice, transfer such
action or appeal to any other such court in which the action or appeal could have been brought at
the time it was filed or noticed .... ").
206. Rafoth, supra note 53, at 274.
207. Id. at 275.
208. As discussed above, in the Hurricane Katrina litigation, courts held that each levee
breach was a "single accident." However, in most cases, the defendant could not make a prima
facie showing that a single levee breach caused seventy-five deaths in a discrete location. See
supra note 165 and accompanying text. In natural disaster cases, it is unlikely that a single
accident can be identified that meets MMTJA's threshold. However, one could imagine an
earthquake that caused a large building to collapse and kill at least seventy-five people. In this
scenario, it is likely that the building collapse would qualify as a single accident that meets the
requirements of § 1369. However, only actions arising from the building collapse-and not the
earthquake generally-would have federal court jurisdiction.
209. Section 1441(e)(1)(B) only applies when the removed action arises out of the same
single accident as the related federal action. Therefore, if the removed action arises out of a
different accident, subsection (e)(l)(B) will not apply.
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circumstances. For example, it may apply if a substantial majority of
the passengers of a commuter train crash were in-state citizens and
the directly responsible parties all had citizenship in that state. It is
less likely to apply in an airplane crash or hotel fire situation because
the potential plaintiffs are more likely to have diverse citizenship,
making it difficult to achieve the "substantial majority"
requirement.21°
Finally, even if minimal diversity is not met or the abstention
provision applies, the action can be removed under §
1441(e)(1)(B)."' If one of the defendants is party to another suit that
arises from the same accident causing seventy-five deaths in a
discrete location, the action will be removable." 2 Although the
removal may be unconstitutional, Congress can easily remedy that
infirmity by amending the removal statute to require consolidation
between § 144 1(e)(1) removed cases and related federal cases."'
Even though single-accident mass disasters will likely end up in
federal court, this is not necessarily a bad thing. In these rare cases,
the advantages of consolidation and the procedural benefits conferred
by MMTJA might make federal court the most favorable forum to
plaintiffs.
B. CAFA: Class and Mass Actions
CAFA is the "most significant legislative reform of complex
litigation in American history"21 4 because it shifts the lion's share of
state-law-based complex litigation to federal court. However,
Congress did leave a few types of class and mass actions beyond the
reach of federal jurisdiction. These carve-outs can be divided into
three categories. First, actions that are not minimally diverse and
have an aggregate amount in controversy greater than $5 million are
not removable.2 5 Second, CAFA's grant of original jurisdiction
210. Although it may be possible to manipulate the "primary defendants" component of the
provision by electing not to sue directly responsible parties who are out-of-state residents, the
larger barrier will be meeting the "substantial majority of all plaintiffs requirement." See supra
Part IV.A.2.b.i.
211. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(l)(B).
212. Id.
213. See supra Part IV.A.2.b.
214. Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Burdens of Jurisdictional Proof 59 ALA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 2), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1005477.
215. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (original jurisdiction requirements).
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"shall not apply" to three categories of cases: (1) class actions with
less than 100 members; (2) class actions in which the primary
defendants are states; and (3) securities actions. 16 For the purposes
of this Article, these cases are called "exemptions." Third, Congress
included two mandatory 217 and one discretionary"t 8 exceptions to
CAFA jurisdiction. The main difference between these three
categories of carve-outs is the burden of proof. Defendants have the
burden to prove the jurisdictional requirements,1 9 while plaintiffs
have the burden to establish that an exception applies.22° Courts are
still split on which party bears the burden of proof for exemptions.221
Because this burden shifting is "key to determining whether state
class-actions will survive at all, 222 plaintiffs have an advantage when
they plead out of CAFA's jurisdictional requirements because the
burden of proof is on the defendant.
216. § 1332(d)(5), (9).
217. § 1332(d)(4) (home-state and local controversy exceptions).
218. § 1332(d)(3) (interest of justice exception).
219. Initially, some courts held that plaintiffs had the burden to prove the basic jurisdictional
requirements. See, e.g., Berry v. Am. Express Publ'g, Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1122-23
(C.D. Cal. 2005). Now, it is virtually settled that the initial burden falls on the party seeking
federal jurisdiction, in accordance with the long-standing presumption against federal jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 57-58 (2d Cir. 2006); Morgan v. Gay, 471
F.3d 469, 472-73 (3d Cir. 2006); Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co. 443 F.3d 676, 683-86 (9th
Cir. 2006); Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1327-28 (11th Cir. 2006); Brill v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 447-48 (7th Cir. 2005). See generally Shapiro,
supra note 33, at 88-98 (arguing that Congress is responsible for correcting any drafting error
that does not reflect its intent and that Congress has no discretion to create a presumption of
minimal diversity, although it could theoretically create a presumption that the amount in
controversy is satisfied); Hoffnan, supra note 214, at 6-8.
220. All circuit courts and the majority of district courts that have considered this question
place the burden of proof to establish an exception on the plaintiff. See, e.g., Serrano v. 180
Connect, Inc., 478 F.3d 1018, 1021-24 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the party seeking remand
bears the burden to prove an exception to CAFA's jurisdiction); Preston v. Tenet Healthsystems
Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 F.3d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 2007) ("[O]nce federal jurisdiction has been
established under [CAFA], the objecting party bears the burden of proof as to the applicability of
any express statutory exception ...." (quoting Serrano, 478 F.3d at 1024)); Frazier v. Pioneer
Ams. LLC, 455 F.3d 542, 545 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that the Eleventh Circuit places the burden
to demonstrate a CAFA exception on plaintiffs); Hart v. FedEx Ground Package Sys. Inc., 457
F.3d 675, 679-82 (7th Cir. 2006) (agreeing with the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits that the burden
shifts to plaintiffs to prove that the local controversy exception should apply). But see Hoffman,
supra note 214, at 8-45 (arguing that courts have gotten it wrong and that the burden should not
shift to the plaintiff to prove the application of an exception).
221. See infra Part IV.B.2.
222. Shapiro, supra note 33, at 86.
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1. Pleading out of CAFA
To plead out of CAFA, a plaintiffs attorney can strategically
tailor the class and choose the defendants to avoid minimal diversity,
or she can circumscribe the requested relief below the jurisdictional
threshold.2 ' Although both strategies are discussed below, it is
practically impossible to avoid minimal diversity. Therefore, the
majority of strategic maneuvering will occur in pleading the amount
in controversy.
a. Avoid minimal diversity
In the vast majority of cases, defendants will have no problem
meeting their burden of proving that one defendant is diverse224 from
one class member.25  Diversity is determined according to
citizenship, which is different than residency.226 Unlike residency,
which can be temporary, citizenship is the state where people have
their permanent domicile-the place where they intend to return or
their previous permanent home. 27 For example, college students and
young adults may reside in a particular state but may be citizens
where their parents' home is located.228 Courts consistently hold that
residency cannot be equated with citizenship and often presume that
a class of residents contains at least one non-citizen.229
Therefore, the only way to defeat minimal diversity is to define
the plaintiff class according to citizenship and sue only those
223. Additional strategies are available for mass actions. See infra Part IV.B. I.c.
224. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) states that minimal diversity is satisfied when:
(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any
defendant;
(B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a
foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; or
(C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any defendant is a
foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state.
225. Shapiro, supra note 33, at 106. But see Roche v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., No. 07-367-
GPM, 2007 WL 2003092, at *2 n.4 (S.D. Il1. July 06, 2007) (holding that class defined as
"licensed healthcare providers in Illinois" sufficiently restricts the proposed class to Illinois
citizens when defendant fails to produce any evidence that the class includes non-Illinois
citizens).
226. Shapiro, supra note 33, at 106.
227. Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir. 1974).
228. Holmes v. Sopuch, 639 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1981).
229. See, e.g., McMorris v. TJX Cos, 493 F. Supp. 2d 158, 162-63 (D. Mass. 2007) (noting
that the class of Massachusetts residents probably had at least one non-citizen).
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defendants who are citizens of that same state. 3 No court has ever
had the opportunity to consider a class limited to citizens of a
particular state.23" ' The problem with classes defined by citizenship is
that, unlike residency or other local identifiers, "the characteristic of
state citizenship usually has virtually no relationship to any real
distinctions as to whether someone should be a member of the class
or not."'232 Although defining a class according to state citizenship
may be permissible, a judge is unlikely to look favorably upon such
gerrymandering.
Moreover, even if a class can be legitimately defined according
to state citizenship, plaintiffs can only sue in-state defendants.233
Because some courts hold that minimal diversity is satisfied between
co-citizens as long as one party is a citizen of more than one state,234
any corporation that has citizenship in more than one state will create
minimal diversity.235 Considering that consumer class actions are
typically filed against corporate defendants, who are usually citizens
of multiple states, this is problematic. The contortions necessary to
defeat minimal diversity make it unlikely that many plaintiffs will
use this strategy, unless the state court forum is substantially more
favorable.
230. Shapiro, supra note 33, at 107.
231. The case that came closest to using this strategy is Schwartz v. Comcast Corp., No.
CIV.A.05-2340, 2005 WL 1799414, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2005), in which the plaintiff filed an
amended complaint after removal changing the class definition from "residents" to "citizens" of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The court avoided commenting on the amended complaint
because it held that a motion to remand must be based on the record as it stood when the action
was removed. Id.
232. Shapiro, supra note 33, at 108.
233. Generally, plaintiffs are allowed to forfeit claims against out of state defendants to keep
their action in state court. See Roche v. Country Mutual Ins. Co., No. 07-367-GPM 2007 WL
2003092, at * 1 (S.D. 111. July 6, 2007) (holding that defendants cannot create minimal diversity
by invoking mandatory joinder when the plaintiff purposely avoided naming an out-of-state
defendant to preserve the local nature of the action). However, it is not permissible to dismiss
defendants for the sole purpose of destroying diversity. See Braud v. Transp. Serv. Co. of Ill.,
445 F.3d 801, 808-09 (5th Cir. 2006).
234. See Fuller v. Home Depot Servs., LLC, No. CIV.A.l:07-CV-1268-RLV, 2007 WL
2345257, at *3 n.2 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 14, 2007); see also McMorris, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 164 ("It is
possible, though far from clear, that one can have opposing parties in a two-party case who are
cocitizens, and yet have minimal Article III jurisdiction because of the multiple citizenship [sic]
of one of the parties." (citing Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 577 n.6
(2004)).
235. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2000).
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Another way that plaintiffs could potentially evade the minimal
diversity requirement is by using a binding stipulation. 236  Although
courts have legitimized this practice with respect to the amount in
controversy,237 it is unclear what defendants could gain by
stipulating, for example, that all residents in the plaintiff class are
also citizens of the state. 38 In sum, defeating minimal diversity will
be incredibly difficult, unless courts permit state citizenship classes.
A savvy plaintiffs' attorney will have better luck testing the
flexibility of the amount in controversy requirement.
b. Limit amount in controversy to less than $5 million
In addition to minimal diversity, jurisdiction under CAFA
requires that the aggregate amount in controversy exceed $5 million,
exclusive of interests and costs.239 The amount in controversy
includes all types of damages (including compensatory and
punitive), 4' the value of restitution and injunctive relief, and
attorneys fees.24" '
Unlike the minimal diversity requirement, which is nearly
impossible to defeat, creatively pleading the amount in controversy
can enable plaintiffs to retain their choice of forum. Many courts
recognize that plaintiffs are "masters of the complaint" and may
choose to restrict claims or requested relief to stay in state court.242
At the same time, courts will not permit bad faith pleadings that
manipulate the rules to keep cases in state court when they
236. See Roche, 2007 WL 2003092, at *2 n.4.
237. See Smith v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 05-CV-0112-MJR, 2005 WL 3618319, at *4-5 (S.D. Ill.
Mar. 24, 2005) (discussing how binding stipulations should prevent plaintiff from collecting
more than the alleged amount in controversy).
238. Stipulating the amount in controversy limits the amount of damages that the defendant
will have to pay. However, a stipulation regarding citizenship does not convey any similar
economic benefit that would induce the defendant to enter into the agreement.
239. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (establishing jurisdictional amount); §
1332(d)(5) (permitting aggregation).
240. Sometimes, certain legal claims will preclude punitive damages. See, e.g., Smith v.
Nationwide Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401, 407-08 (6th Cir. 2007) (punitive damages not
available in breach of contract actions).
241. See, e.g., Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 479 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2007)
(noting that attorney fees are properly included in the amount in controversy in a class action);
see also Shapiro, supra note 33, at 112-13.
242. See, e.g., Lowdernilk, 479 F.3d at 998-99.
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legitimately belong in federal court.2 43  When considering the
strategies detailed below, it is important to keep the good faith
requirement in mind.
i. Standard of proof
As discussed above, most courts hold that the party seeking
federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proving the jurisdictional
requirements in § 1332(d)(2). 2' However, courts are split on
whether the standard of proof should be "legal certainty,"
"preponderance of the evidence," or "reasonable probability. 245
Moreover, some courts use different standards depending on whether
the amount in controversy is specifically alleged or left unstated.246
Often, the standard is dispositive. For example, defendants face a
nearly impossible task of proving that plaintiffs' relief will exceed
the jurisdictional amount as a matter of law but can easily establish
the existence of a "reasonable probability."
Both the Third and the Ninth Circuits require defendants to
prove the jurisdictional amount to a legal certainty when the plaintiff
specifies an amount in controversy less than $5 million.247 These
courts reason that the high burden on defendants is balanced by the
good faith pleading requirement and the established principle that
plaintiffs are the masters of their own complaint. 248 To date, virtually
243. In Lowdermilk, the court recognized that the rules permit plaintiffs to evade federal
jurisdiction through artful pleading, even when they know that the amount in controversy is
greater than $5 million. Id. at 999. The court characterized such manipulation as bad faith
conduct that is punishable through judicial estoppel. The court explained that the rules are
properly used when the plaintiff cannot anticipate the value of their case. Id. at 1002-03.
244. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
245. See infra notes 248-69.
246. See, e.g., Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 196-97 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that the
legal certainty standard is limited to cases where plaintiffs specifically allege that the amount in
controversy is less than the jurisdictional amount, but that it does not apply when the complaint is
silent).
247. Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 999; Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 475 (3d Cir. 2006),
overruled in part by Frederico, 507 F.3d at 196 (noting that the legal certainty standard is limited
to cases where plaintiffs specifically allege that the amount in controversy is less than the
jurisdictional amount; it does not apply when the complaint is silent); see also Thrift Auto Repair,
Inc. v. U.S. Bancorp, No. CIV.A.I:07-CV-1051-TWT, 2007 WL 2788465, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Sept.
21, 2007) (holding that the legal certainty test applies when a plaintiff asserts a specific claim in
an ad damnum clause for less than the jurisdictional amount); Cleveland v. Ark-La-Tex Fin.
Servs., LLC, No. CIV.A.07-0444-CG-M, 2007 WL 2460753, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 24, 2007)
(stating in dicta that the legal certainty test applies when plaintiff specifically claims less than the
jurisdictional amount in the complaint).
248. Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 998-99, 1002-03; Morgan, 471 F.3d at 474.
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no defendant has met the legal certainty standard,249 although some
have successfully brought a lower standard of proof into play by
arguing that plaintiffs failed to allege the amount in controversy with
sufficient specificity. 2 ° For example, in Frederico the plaintiff
specified her own damages but failed to specify the aggregate
amount in controversy or the class size, beyond a general allegation
that there are "thousands, if not tens of hundreds of thousands" of
class members. 251  The court held that the complaint did not
specifically allege the amount in controversy and that a case should
only be remanded "if it appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff
cannot recover more than the jurisdictional amount.
252
Although the burden on defendants seems insurmountable under
this standard, it is not. Defendants usually possess the information
necessary to determine the amount in controversy. If they fail to
produce sufficient evidence, it is most likely because there is no
evidence that will satisfy the jurisdictional amount or they are
unwilling to disclose the information 3.2  For example, in Lowdermilk
249. See, e.g., Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 1002 (defendant failed to prove the jurisdictional
amount to a legal certainty in a wage and hour class action because it "speculate[d] as to the size
of the class, the amount of unpaid wages owed to the rounding policy, and whether or not
members of the class qualify for penalty wages"); Morgan, 471 F.3d at 475-76 (defendant failed
to prove the jurisdictional amount to a legal certainty in a false advertising case because it did not
substantiate its punitive damages allegations, did not specify the amount of profit that would be
eligible for disgorgement, and did not support its allegations of compensatory damages with
statistical sales information); see also Shapiro, supra note 33, at Ill (explaining that the legal
certainty standard is rarely met by a removing defendant because there are "few, if any, rules of
law [that] require damages of a certain amount to be awarded"). Contra Faltaous v. Johnson &
Johnson, No. CIV.A.07-1572 (JLL), 2007 WL 3256833, at *7 (D.N.J. Nov. 5, 2007) (defendant
met legal certainty standard when plaintiff failed to stipulate that the amount in controversy was
less than $5 million and provided all the information necessary to determine that the amount in
controversy exceeded the jurisdictional threshold); Reibstein v. Cont'l Tire N. Am., Inc., No.
CIV.A.07-302, 2007 WL 1030486, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2007) (finding that defendant satisfied
legal certainty test in breach of warranty case where plaintiff failed to offer any evidence tending
to rebut defendants' statistics and calculations).
250. See, e.g., Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 700-01 (9th Cir. 2007)
(finding that the complaint did not specifically allege the amount in controversy when it
stipulated that damages were less than jurisdictional amount in the jurisdiction section, but that it
failed to state the total amount in controversy in the prayer for relief and requests relief in
addition to damages); see also Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 998 (holding that where the court is
required to "look beyond the four comers of the complaint to determine whether the CAFA
jurisdictional amount is met," the amount of controversy is not specifically alleged).
251. Frederico, 507 F.3d at 197.
252. Id. at 195.
253. Some courts justify placing a high burden on the defendant because the "facts necessary
for a more precise estimate of the class size are uniquely within its knowledge." See, e.g.,
Wexler v. United Air Lines, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 2d 150, 155 (D.D.C. 2007)
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v. U.S. Bank National Ass 'n,254 the defendant-employer tried to prove
that the amount-in-controversy was satisfied by producing evidence
of the number of employees that left the company during the
specified period.2 55 The Ninth Circuit rejected the sufficiency of this
evidence because it did not specify the number of hourly workers.256
Because a large corporate employer is highly likely to classify its
workers and keep track of the numbers in each category, it can be
inferred that the defendant either could not-or did not want
to-produce the information.
At the other end of the spectrum are the Second and Seventh
Circuits, which only require defendants to meet a standard of
"reasonable probability. 257 Courts using this standard rarely reject
defendants' evidence that the amount in controversy threshold is
met.258 For example, in Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,259 the
defendant met its burden by admitting that one of its employees sent
at least 3,800 fax ads in contravention of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act, arguing that damages could exceed $5 million in total
254. 479 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2007).
255. Id. at 1000.
256. Id. at 1001.
257. Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2006), enforced by Kocienda v. U-
Haul Int'l, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-954-WWE, 2007 WL 2572269, at *1 (D. Conn. Sept. 4, 2007));
Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2005). Although subsequent
district court decisions in the Seventh Circuit articulate the test as "preponderance of the
evidence," many apply it like a "reasonable probability" test. Compare Espinosa v. Philip Morris
USA, Inc., No. 07-C-231, 2007 WL 917383, at *2 (N.D. Ill. March 26, 2007) ("Defendants are
not required to establish with overwhelming evidence the precise amount in controversy ....
Defendants need only prove their position by the preponderance of the evidence [standard]."),
with Wexler v. United Air Lines, Inc. 496 F. Supp. 2d 150, 155 (D.D.C. 2007) ("Miedema [which
used the preponderance of the evidence standard] is instructive as an example of the substantial
burden the removing party bears in establishing the amount in controversy under CAFA.")
(emphasis added). But see Simenz v. Amerihome Mortgage Co., LLC, No. 07-C-601, 2007 WL
3129725, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 23, 2007) (remanding under a "higher burden" preponderance
standard, in which "all doubts should be resolved against removal in order to respect the
plaintiffs choice of forum").
258. Contra Simenz, 2007 WL 3129725, at *1 (remanding the case when defendant failed to
offer evidence that supported its estimate of the class size, its assumption of maximum damages,
and its inclusion of punitive damages); Hall v. Triad Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 07-CV-0184-MJR,
2007 WL 2948405, at *4 (S.D. Il1. Oct. 10, 2007) (remanding because defendant calculations
contradicted its own figures). Moreover, although courts permit plaintiffs to stipulate an amount
in controversy below the jurisdictional threshold, a stipulation is not dispositive. Morgan v. Gay,
471 F.3d 469, 474-75 (3d Cir. 2006). Courts will scrutinize the plaintiffs' actual demands to
ensure that the claim is actually for less than the jurisdictional minimum. Id. at 475.
259. 427 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2005).
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if trebled damages were granted.26 ° Similarly, in Home Depot, Inc. v.
Rickher,261 defendant met its burden by submitting a declaration that
enjoining damage waivers could bring the total amount in
controversy over $5 million, even though it failed to show that it
would be enjoined from selling all damage waivers. 62 These cases
stand in stark contrast to those that employ the legal certainty
standard, where the court remands whenever the amount of
controversy is speculative.263
Once the defendant demonstrates a reasonable probability that
the jurisdictional amount is met, the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to establish to a legal certainty that the amount in
controversy is less than $5 million.2 6 Considering the low burden on
defendants and the high burden on plaintiffs, it is difficult to imagine
a situation where plaintiffs could prevail on a motion to remand.
One untested strategy, suggested in dicta,265 is to specifically allege
that the amount in controversy is less than $5 million.
Between the extremes of "legal certainty" and "reasonable
probability" is the "preponderance of the evidence" standard.2 66  The
Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits apply this standard when the
complaint does not specify the amount in controversy, 267 and the
260. Id. at 449.
261. No. 06-8006, 2006 WL 1727749 (7th Cir. 2006).
262. Id.; see also Musgrave v. Aluminum Co. of Am., Inc., No. 3:06-CV-0029-RLY-WGH,
2006 WL 1994840, at *2 (S.D. Ind. July 14, 2006) (finding that defendant met the burden by
alleging that 458 people were injured).
263. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
264. See Brill, 427 F.3d at 449.
265. See id. ("The complaint did not set a cap on recovery-as it might have done if the
plaintiff had represented that the class would neither seek nor accept more than $5 million in
aggregate."). But cf Fiore v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., No. 05-CV-474-DRH, 2005 WL 3434074,
at *2-3 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 2005) (noting that a plaintiffs stipulation that the amount in
controversy is less than $5 million was not made in good faith when the complaint alleges that the
class contains over 8,000,000 members who are each seeking substantial damages).
266. Using a preponderance of the evidence standard to consider naked pleadings can be an
awkward exercise. See Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1209 (1 th Cir. 2007) ("There
is a unique tension in applying a fact-weighing standard to a fact-free context."). Consequently,
many courts have characterized this standard as a "more likely than not" assessment. Id. at 1209
n.57 (citing Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996)).
267. See Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 2007) (removal upheld);
Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 698-99 (9th Cir. 2007) (same); Lowery v.
Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1210 (1 1th Cir. 2007) (same). In addition, district courts in the
Fourth, Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits apply the preponderance standard to evaluate the amount
in controversy when the complaint is not specific. See, e.g., Wexler v. United Air Lines, Inc., 496
F. Supp. 2d 150, 155 (D.D.C. 2007) (ordering remand using the preponderance of the evidence
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Sixth Circuit applies it when the complaint specifically alleges the
amount in controversy.26 Under this standard, some defendants have
been able to meet their burden, while others have not. The difference
between the two groups turns on the scope of evidence allowed by
the court and how carefully the complaint is drafted.
ii. Scope of evidence
The only court to explicitly address the scope of evidence
available to defendants to satisfy their burden is the Eleventh
Circuit.2 69  When the propriety of removal is challenged before the
Eleventh Circuit,27° a case will be remanded unless the jurisdictional
amount is clearly stated on the face of the removing documents or
readily deducible from them.27' When damages are unspecified, a
defendant cannot satisfy its burden by speculating about the potential
value of damages.7 Moreover, a defendant may only rely on the
papers supplied by the plaintiff73 and cannot engage in post-removal
standard applied in Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1331 (11 th Cir. 2006); Nowak v.
Innovative Aftermarket Sys., No. 4:06-CV-01622-ERW, 2007 WL 2454118, at *3 n.2 (E.D. Mo.
Aug. 23, 2007) (remanded); Hooks v. Am. Med. Sec. Life Ins. Co, No. 3:06-CV-00071, 2006 WL
2504903, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 29, 2006) (parties ordered to submit partial discovery plans),
motion to remand denied in, 2007 WL 880610 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 21, 2007); Ongstad v. Piper
Jaffray & Co., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1090 (D.N.D. 2006) (remanded); Plummer v. Farmers
Group, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1318 (E.D. Okla. 2005) (motion to remand denied).
268. Smith v. Nationwide Prop. And Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401, 408 (6th Cir. 2007) (upheld
on remand). In addition, district courts in the Fourth and Eighth Circuits apply the preponderance
of the evidence standard to evaluate specific allegations about the amount in controversy. See,
e.g., Strawn v. AT&T Mobility Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 599, 604 (E.D. Ark. 2007) (remanded);
Toiler v. Sagamore Ins. Co., 514 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1115 (E.D. Ark. 2007) (same).
269. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1211-15 (involving a mass action with over 400 plaintiffs).
270. The Eleventh Circuit differentiates challenging the propriety of removal, which is only
available within the thirty-day window following removal, from challenging subject matter
jurisdiction, which can be raised at any time. Id. at 1213 n.64. When a party challenges the
propriety of removal, it can only rely on the removal papers; whereas when a party challenges
subject matter jurisdiction, it can present any relevant information. Id.
271. Id.
272. Defendants in Lowery argued that the value of plaintiffs' claims was at least $12,500 per
plaintiff. Id. at 1220. Since there were more than 400 plaintiffs, defendants reasoned that the
total amount in controversy exceeded $5 million. Id. at 1188. The court rejected this reasoning,
holding that defendants' argument amounted to "impermissible speculation-evaluating without
the benefit of any evidence [of] the value of individual claims." Id. at 1220.
273. See id. at 1220-21 (rejecting evidence of the value of purportedly similar tort claims in
the same state); Thrift Auto Repair, Inc. v. U.S. Bancorp, No. CIV.A.I:07-CV-1051-TWT, 2007
WL 2788465, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2007) (holding that when plaintiffs allege the types of
fees in the complaint, but fail to allege monetary figures, the defendant cannot provide them
through an affidavit).
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jurisdictional discovery.2 4 However, the defendant can introduce
evidence when the underlying substantive law provides a rule that
allows the court to determine the amount of damages 27 5 or when the
court receives evidence post-removal from the plaintiff that supports
federal jurisdiction.276 Needless to say, this test is very difficult-if
not impossible-to meet.11 Other jurisdictions do not limit removal
nearly as much in practice, although it remains to be seen whether
other courts will follow the Eleventh Circuit's lead.278
iii. Pleading strategies
In state courts located within the Eleventh Circuit, filing a
complaint with unspecified damages will generally be sufficient to
protect the case from removal.279  Likewise, filing a complaint in the
Third and Ninth Circuits that specifically limits the amount in
controversy will probably keep a case in state court. 28" Nevertheless,
pleading carefully is important, regardless of the jurisdiction. For
example, even in the Third Circuit, an express limitation of damages
will be trumped if the plaintiffs actual monetary demands exceed the
jurisdictional amount.28'
274. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1218 ("Post-removal discovery disrupts the careful assignment of
burdens and the delicate balance struck by the underlying rules. A district court should not insert
itself into the fray by granting leave for the defendant to conduct discovery or by engaging in its
own discovery. Doing so impermissibly lightens the defendant's burden of establishing
jurisdiction.").
275. Id. at 1214 n.66 (holding that evidence of damages that arise out of a contract provision
is admissible because the default measure of damages is expectation damages). But see Thrift
Auto Repair, 2007 WL 2788465, at *3 (holding that a defendant cannot introduce evidence of
damages arising out of a contract when the contract does not lend itself to a fair approximation of
the measure of expectation damages).
276. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1214, n.66 (providing example of a defendant that effectively
amended its insufficient notice of removal by alleging that plaintiff had offered settlement for an
amount greater than the jurisdictional minimum after removal).
277. In Lowery, the court recognized that a defendant who satisfied its burden on the
pleadings could actually satisfy a much higher standard, such as legal certainty. Id. at 1211.
278. See, e.g., Toiler, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 1120 (ordering parties "'to submit summary-
judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal' (quoting
Allen v. R& H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1336 (5th Cir. 1995)).
279. After Lowery, a defendant cannot speculate about unspecified damages or produce its
own evidence, so a complaint with unspecified damages will generally preclude removal. See
supra Part IV.B. 1.b.ii.
280. See supra Part IV.B.l.b.i.
281. Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 474-75 (3d Cir. 2006).
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A few general pointers can be gleaned from the case law. First,
including an ad damnum252 in the demand for relief is important. It is
not sufficient to merely allege that the amount in controversy is less
than $5 million in the jurisdictional section of the complaint. 83
Although the defendant can overcome this allegation with evidence,
an ad damnum clause will heighten the standard of proof in some
circuits and alert the judge in any circuit that the plaintiffs choice of
forum is state court. Many courts recognize that the plaintiff is the
master of the complaint and can limit claims and types of relief to
maintain her forum choice. 84 However, a major drawback to
including a specific damages limitation is the inability to collect
more than the jurisdictional amount.28 5  In particular, such a
limitation may pose fairness problems when the class size is
unknown. 86 Therefore, a specific damages limitation should only be
used when the estimated amount in controversy is fairly close to the
jurisdictional amount; otherwise, the sacrifice of using the limitation
will likely outweigh its benefits.
One way to legitimately reduce the amount in controversy is by
defining the class narrowly. For example, the amount in controversy
implicated by a statewide class is significantly less than the amount
at stake in a nationwide or worldwide class because fewer people are
involved. Although defining a class by state residency will not
defeat minimal diversity, it will circumscribe the class so that the
amount in controversy is smaller.87 Another way to circumscribe the
class is to include a specific condition to class membership. For
282. An ad damnum clause is a clause in a prayer for relief stating the amount of damages
claimed. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 14 (2nd Pocket Ed. 2001).
283. See Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2007).
284. See, e.g., Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 479 F.3d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[A]
plaintiff may sue for less than the amount she may be entitled to if she wishes to avoid federal
jurisdiction and remain in state court.").
285. Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 476-78 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[P]laintiffs in state court should
not be permitted to ostensibly limit their damages to avoid federal court only to receive an award
in excess of the federal amount in controversy requirement.").
286. See Shapiro, supra note 33, at 120-21 (discussing the problems of limiting recovery in
the class context).
287. Compare Morgan, 471 F.3d at 475-76 (motion to remand granted in statewide class
where defendant failed to produce state-specific evidence to support the jurisdictional amount),
with Kocienda v. U-Haul Int'l, Inc., No. 3:07CV954 (WWE), 2007 WL 2572269, at *1 (D. Conn.
Sept. 4, 2007) (denying a motion to remand where plaintiffs requested relief on behalf of a
worldwide class).
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example, in Pittman v. Chase Home Finance, LLC,285 the class was
defined as "persons [for whom Chase] . . . both was the mortgagee
and failed to record the mortgage satisfaction with the appropriate
county recorder's office in a timely fashion. '289  Defendants
produced evidence of the number of Chase's residential mortgagors
but failed to prove which of these fell into the specific class
definition.290  Therefore, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to
remand.29'
Although the class should be defined with specificity, its size
and the amount of damages should not, unless a limitation clause is
used. Less specific allegations in these areas make it more difficult
for defendants to prove, without speculating, that the amount in
controversy is met. For example, in Ongstad v. Piper Jaffray &
Co.,292 an investor brought a class action suit in state court against a
securities firm for engaging in unauthorized trading of securities.293
Because the complaint provided "scant information regarding
potential damages," the court rejected the defendant's evidence as
speculative.294
In contrast, the complaint in Frederico v. Home Depot.s
contained enough specific facts for defendants to calculate that the
amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdictional amount. 296  The
plaintiff alleged that the class contained "thousands, if not ... tens of
hundreds of thousands" of members and that she was seeking
$287.14 in compensatory damages, plus punitive damages and
attorney fees.297 Using these allegations, the court concluded that a
class of 2233 individuals-which was well under the "tens of
288. No. 1:05CV2470, 2007 WL 2156395 (N.D. Ohio July 25, 2007).
289. Id. at *4.
290. Id. This case can be contrasted with Muniz v. Pilot Travel Centers, which involved a
class of California workers employed by defendant who did not receive overtime compensation or
their required meal and rest periods. Muniz v. Pilot Travel Ctrs., No. S-07-0325 FCD EFB, 2007
WL 1302504, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2007). Because the plaintiff failed to include any fact-
specific allegations that would result in a putative class less than the 100% violation rate used by
the defendant in his calculations, the court denied the motion to remand. Id. at *4.
291. Id. at*5.
292. 407 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (D.N.D. 2006).
293. Id. at 1087.
294. Id. at 1091.
295. 507 F.3d 188, 199 (3d Cir. 2007).
296. Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 199 (3d Cir. 2007).
297. Id. at 197.
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hundreds of thousands" alleged in the complaint-would satisfy the
jurisdictional amount. 98 In fact, this case provides another important
lesson: avoid exaggeration. If the plaintiffs in this case had merely
alleged that the class had thousands of members, the defendant could
only assume 2000 members and probably would not have met its
burden.2 99
Another pleading issue to consider is punitive damages and
injunctive relief. Sometimes, the inclusion of these remedies gives
the defendant a window to argue that the amount in controversy
exceeds $5 million. For example, in Frederico, the court used the
maximum possible punitive damages in its calculations to determine
that the jurisdictional amount was satisfied.00 However, many courts
are unwilling to include punitive damages in jurisdictional amount
calculations, unless the defendant can show that plaintiffs claims
lend themselves to punitive damage awards. In Lamond v. Pepsico,
Inc.,3"' the court remanded a case when defendants failed to prove
any non-economic injury to support plaintiffs request for punitive
damages." 2
Similarly, requesting injunctive relief can be a wild card. In
Home Depot, Inc. v. Rickher, the court evaluated the value of
injunctive relief from the defendant's perspective and held that the
amount in controversy was met, finding the requested injunctive
298. Id. at 199.
299. See Cleveland v. Ark-La-Tex Fin. Servs., LLC, No. CIV.A.07-0444-CG-M, 2007 WL
2460753, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 24, 2007). Where complaint alleged "thousands of persons" and
the requisite class size to meet the jurisdictional amount is 3334, it is "pure speculation" that the
amount in controversy exceeds $5 million because it is conceivable that the class consisted of
only 2000 persons. Id.
300. Frederico, 507 F.3d at 199 ("Frederico can collect punitive damages of up to five times
the compensatory damages.") (emphasis added); see also Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Co., 505 F.3d 401, 408 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[T]his jurisdictional analysis must also take into account
the ability of Plaintiff and the putative class to recover punitive damages, 'unless it is apparent to
a legal certainty that such cannot be recovered."').
301. No. 06-3043 (RMB), 2007 WL 1695401 (D.N.J. June 8, 2007).
302. Id. at *9; see, e.g., Simenz v. Amerihome Mortgage Co., No. 07-C-601, 2007 WL
3129725, at *1 (ED. Wis. Oct. 23, 2007) (rejecting defendants argument that a $3 million
punitive damage award would not be patently unconstitutional and therefore should be included
in the amount in controversy); Nowak v. Innovative Aftermarket Sys., L.P., No. 4:06 CV 01622
ERW, 2007 WL 2454118, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 23, 2007) (noting that court must determine to a
legal certainty that plaintiffs have a valid claim for punitive damages to ensure that Congress'
limits on diversity jurisdiction are properly observed); Brown v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., No. 1:06-
CV-2632, 2007 WL 642011, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 2007) (refusing to include punitive
damages in jurisdictional amount calculation when no court had ever awarded punitive damages
on the claim that plaintiff was asserting).
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relief carried a substantial cost."3 However, many courts will value
injunctive relief from the plaintiff's point of view.3" Because the
standards diverge significantly between different jurisdictions, it is
important to research carefully before including punitive damages or
injunctive relief in a complaint.
In sum, a case is likely to remain in state court if it is filed in a
state within the Eleventh Circuit and the complaint does not specify
damages. Under the Lowery standard, a defendant will face a nearly
insurmountable burden of proving the amount in controversy if it is
not specified. A case is also likely to remain in state court if the
plaintiff limits damages in an ad damnum clause and files in the
Third or Ninth Circuits.
However, when the actual amount in controversy significantly
exceeds the jurisdictional amount, a plaintiff may choose to split the
class into smaller sub-classes or add specific conditions to
circumscribe the class rather than limit the damages. Absent an ad
damnum clause, the more general a complaint, the more likely a case
will remain in state court because the defendant bears the heavy
burden of producing actual evidence of the amount in controversy.
However, a case filed in a state located within the Second or Seventh
Circuits is likely to be removed and to stay in federal court because
of the substantially lower burden of proof that these jurisdictions
impose. Moreover, any case that truly involves more than the $5
303. Home Depot, Inc. v. Rickher, No. 06-8006, 2006 WL 1727749, at *2 (7th Cir. May 22,
2006).
304. See, e.g., DiTolla v. Doral Dental IPA of N.Y., LLC, 469 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 2006); Toiler
v. Sagamore Ins. Co., 514 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1119 (E.D. Ark. 2007) ("When an action seeks
declaratory or injunctive relief, the amount in controversy is measured by the value of the object
of the litigation."). But see, e.g., Wexler v. United Air Lines, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 2d 150, 153
(D.D.C. 2007) ("The value of injunctive relief for determining the amount in controversy can be
calculated as the cost to the defendant."). Other courts use the "either viewpoint rule." See, e.g.,
Hall v. Triad Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 07-CV-0184-MJR, 2007 WL 2948405, at *3 (S.D. Il. Oct. 10,
2007) ("The either viewpoint rule assesses the jurisdictional amount attributable to injunctive
relief by looking at either the benefit to the plaintiff or the cost to the defendant of the requested
relief."). The valuation of injunctive relief can be very important in close cases. For example, in
Rickher, the plaintiff alleged that enjoining Home Depot's sale of damage waivers would have
little value because they were unconscionable. 2006 WL 1727749, at *2. The defendant argued
that it could incur damages of up to $1.2 million per year if plaintiff successfully enjoined
prohibited sale of future waivers. Id. If the court had calculated the value according to the
benefit to the plaintiff, it may not have found that the amount in controversy was met. However,
the court used the defendant's viewpoint and did find that the amount in controversy exceeded $5
million. Id.
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million amount in controversy should be litigated in federal court,
unless one of the exceptions, discussed in Part IV.B.3, applies.
c. A note about mass actions under CAFA
The Eleventh Circuit described CAFA's mass action provisions
as "an opaque, baroque maze of interlocking cross-references that
defy easy interpretation .. ..*""' Although the obtuseness of these
provisions makes pleading out of CAFA a confusing matter, the
Eleventh Circuit-the only court to comprehensively interpret the
mass action provisions-identified at least four jurisdictional
elements that can be gleaned from the text: (1) the aggregate amount
in controversy must exceed $5 million; (2) minimal diversity must
exist between the parties; (3) the action must involve the monetary
claims of 100 or more plaintiffs; and (4) the plaintiffs' claims must
involve common questions of law or fact.3"6
Even if all of these elements are satisfied, a federal court only
has jurisdiction over those plaintiffs whose claims satisfy the
$75,000 amount in controversy requirement in § 1332(a). °7 This
provision raises the possibility of a fifth jurisdictional element: that
at least one plaintiff has individual claims that exceed $75,000.318
Although it did not reach this issue, the 11 th Circuit interpreted §
1332(d)(1 1)(B)(i) as an exception and suggested that the plaintiff has
the burden of proving which, if any, of its claims fell below the
$75,000 amount in controversy. 39 This interpretation is consistent
305. Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1198 (11 th Cir. 2007).
306. Id. at 1202-03.
307. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)( 11)(B)(i) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). Parties battling over jurisdiction
have argued opposing interpretations of this provision. Plaintiffs argue that the provision requires
every plaintiff to satisfy the individual jurisdictional amount, while defendants argue that it
operates as an exception. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1203-04. According to the defendants' view, the
district court could retain jurisdiction over an action even if the total number of plaintiffs in the
action fell below 100 or the aggregate amount of controversy became less than S5 million after
the individual claims were remanded. Id. The Eleventh Circuit adopted the defendants' view by
relying on rules of statutory construction and legislative history. Id. at 1204-07. However,
adopting the defendants' position has potentially unconstitutional applications when remanding
the individual claims results in no diversity.
308. Even if the statute does not require every plaintiff to meet the individual jurisdictional
amount, see § 1332(d)(1 l)(B)(i), the logical inference is that at least one plaintiff must have an
amount in controversy over $75,000. Otherwise, the court would have to remand every single
claim.
309. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1208 n.55.
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with the generally held view that plaintiffs have the burden to prove
express statutory exceptions to CAFA." °
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit treated the $75,000 requirement as
a jurisdictional element and placed the burden on the defendant,
while explicitly declining to interpret the mass action provisions.3 1'
Ultimately, plaintiffs' ability to maintain mass actions in state court
will turn on whom courts decide to place the burden of proof to
establish the $75,000 requirement.
In sum, the aforementioned pleading strategies that apply to
class actions are equally applicable to mass actions. Although the
$75,000 provision is unique to CAFA, pleading out of it will involve
the same techniques that can be used to plead out of the $5 million
aggregate amount in controversy.3"2  Additionally, mass action
plaintiffs have the option of joining fewer than 100 individuals to
avoid CAFA altogether.3"3
2. Pleading into an exemption
CAFA identifies three categories of cases that are exempt from
its grant of original jurisdiction: (1) limited actions;3"4 (2) state
actions;3"5 and (3) securities actions.316 In addition, there are four
exemptions that only apply to mass actions: (1) actions arising from
an in-state event that resulted in localized injuries; (2) claims joined
310. See id.; § 1332(d)(4).
311. Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 690 (9th Cir. 2006) (remanding the
case because defendant failed to establish that any plaintiffs claims involved over $75,000).
312. See supra Part IV.B.l.b; see also Abrego, 443 F.3d at 689-90 (rejecting defendants'
conclusory allegations that the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum was satisfied because of the
nature of plaintiff's injuries).
313. The numerosity requirement in § 1332(d)(1l)(A) through § 1332 (d)(11)(B)(i) is similar
to the limited action exemption in § 1332(d)(5)(B), discussed infra Part IV.B.2.a. However, in a
mass action situation, there is no ambiguity about meeting this requirement-either 100 plaintiffs
are named or not. In the class action context, class size is usually speculative. Moreover, the
numerosity requirement is part of the definition of a mass action, which means that it is a
jurisdictional element that the defendant has the burden of proving. The nature of the numerosity
requirement is less clear in the class action context and courts are split on who bears the burden of
proof. See infra Part IV.B.2.a.
314. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B) (classes with less than 100 members).
315. § 1332(d)(5)(A) (actions in which the primary defendants are states, state officials, or
other governmental entities).
316. § 1332(d)(9) (including class actions solely involving a security that are directed at
internal corporate affairs or relate to the rights, duties, and obligations associated with a security);
28 U.S.C. § 1453(d) (2000) (excepting securities actions from the general class action removal
rules).
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upon motion of a defendant; (3) actions in which all of the claims are
asserted on behalf of the general public; and (4) claims that are
consolidated or coordinated solely for pretrial proceedings.31 Only a
handful of courts have analyzed these provisions, and even those
have not reached a consensus about who bears the burden of proving
them. Some courts, particularly in the limited action context, hold
that exemptions are jurisdictional requirements that must be proven
by the party seeking federal jurisdiction.318 Others hold that they are
exceptions and that the party seeking remand has the burden of
proof.319 Until the burden of proof is definitively assigned, a
plaintiffs attorney should assume that she will have the burden of
proof and prepare accordingly.
a. Limited actions
The limited action provision under § 1332(d)(5)(B) exempts
small class actions with less than 100 class members from CAFA
jurisdiction. 2 1 Most courts interpret this provision as a jurisdictional
element of numerosity, which the defendant has the burden of
proving.12 For example, one court remanded a class action when the
defendant failed to come forward with evidence that the class had
100 or more members, merely alleging that the "expansive and open-
ended scope of the purported class allegations" supported federal
court jurisdiction under CAFA.32 2 The court was particularly irritated
that the defendant failed to support its claim with specific facts when
317. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(ii). I have chosen not to analyze these provisions in this
Article because no cases have interpreted them. For a good overview of the congressional intent
and possible application of these provisions, see S. Amy Spencer, Developments, Once More into
the Breach, Dear Friends: The Case for Congressional Revision of the Mass Action Provisions in
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1067, 1093-97 (2006).
318. See, e.g., Ongstad v. Piper Jaffray & Co., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (D.N.D. 2006) (stating
that § 1332(d)(5)(B) is a jurisdictional element).
319. See, e.g., Frazier v. Pioneer Ams. LLC, 455 F.3d 542 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that
plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the state action exception applies).
320. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B) (2000).
321. See, e.g., Ongstad, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 1090.
322. Pierce v. TTP, Inc., No. 06-0712-CV-W-DW, 2006 WL 3827517, at *1-2 (W.D. Mo.
Dec. 28, 2006) (noting a class of "all Missouri consumers [of florist products] who have been
damaged by Defendant's deception, misrepresentations, concealment, or fraud arising from its
fictitious telephone directory or internet listings") (alteration in original).
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they were within his knowledge.323 However, the court in Kitson v.
Bank of Edwardsville24 upheld removal when the defendant
produced a spreadsheet of commercial loan borrowers, which
indicated that 9000 commercial loans were made during the relevant
time.325 Even taking into account the fact that some borrowers in the
class held multiple loans from the defendant, the court was satisfied
that the class contained far more than 100 members.
On the other hand, at least one court interpreted this provision as
an exception to jurisdiction that the plaintiff has the burden of
proving.327 In Garcia v. Boyar & Miller, P.C.,38 the plaintiffs argued
that their class encompassed fewer than 100 members by presenting
defendant's media statements that fewer than 100 employees had
been fired or quit due to matters complained about in the litigation.329
The court held that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden, reasoning
that the defendants' statements actually applied to a smaller
"universe" of people than the class encompassed and that plaintiffs'
own pleadings and evidence supported a conclusion that the class
size exceeded 100 members.330
Several lessons can be taken from these cases. First, if a class
cannot be defined narrowly, this provision should not be used to
escape federal jurisdiction because it is too easy for a defendant to
produce some evidence that the class is larger than alleged.
331
Second, alleging facts in pleadings or briefs that contradict
allegations of a small class will almost always result in the denial of
323. Id. ("In opposition to remand, TTP does not state the number of listings with Missouri
addresses or telephone numbers from which it has derived business. Nor does it reveal, or even
approximate, how many sales it has made through telephone numbers with Missouri prefixes.").
324. No. 06-528-GPM, 2006 WL 3392752 (S.D. I11. Nov. 22, 2006).
325. Id. at *2.
326. Id.
327. Garcia v. Boyar & Miller, P.C., Nos. 3:06-CV-1936-D, 3:06-CV-1937-D, 3:06-CV-
1938-D, 3:06-CV-1939-D, 3:06-CV-2177-D, 3:06-CV-2206-D; 3:06-CV-2236-D, 3:06-CV-
2241-D, 2007 WL 1556961, at *4 (N.D. Tex. May 30, 2007).
328. Id.
329. Id. at *5 (proposing a class of employees whom defendants promised to help obtain
citizenship through the LIFE Act in exchange for a weekly payroll deduction).
330. Id.
331. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cheetah Transp., No. 06-0005, 2006 WL 468820, at *2 (W.D. La.
Feb. 27, 2006). The class of individuals and persons that resided in Caldwell parish on October
7, 2004, and were affected by the closure of the Columbia bridge did not contest numerosity
because it knew that the class exceeded 100 members; instead, it attacked jurisdiction by arguing
that a local action exception applied. Id.
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a motion to remand.332 So far, no cases have tested whether it is
permissible to break down a larger class action into several smaller
classes. For example, could the class of commercial borrowers in
Kitson have been split into multiple state or county-specific classes,
each with fewer than 100 plaintiffs? At least one scholar suggests
that such arbitrary divisions would be problematic.333 To avoid
accusations of manipulation, plaintiffs' attorneys are best off using
this provision to define classes narrowly when there are real
justifications that warrant drawing those lines.334 If there are no real
justifications for drawing such lines, then other strategies should be
considered.
b. State action
The state action exemption under § 1332(d)(5)(A) excludes class
actions in which the "primary defendants are States, State officials,
or other governmental entities against whom the district court may be
foreclosed from ordering relief."'335 The only court to interpret this
provision is the Fifth Circuit in Frazier v. Pioneer Americas LLC.336
In Frazier, a class of citizens that lived near a contaminated facility
sued the company-owner and the Louisiana Department of
Environmental Quality for negligence, seeking damages for personal
injury.337 The company removed, and plaintiffs moved to remand,
arguing that the state action exemption precluded jurisdiction.33 8 The
Fifth Circuit denied plaintiffs' motion, holding that plaintiffs had not
332. See, e.g., Garcia, 2007 WL 1556961, at *5 (pleadings and initial disclosures establish
that class has more than 100 members); Kendrick v. Standard Fire Ins. Co, No. 06-141-DLB,
2007 WL 1035018, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2007) (holding that plaintiffs allegation that there
was "likely tens of thousands of members of the Plaintiffs' Class" was sufficient to uphold
removal, even if Defendant could not come forth with any actual evidence of plaintiff class size
(citing Ahearn v. Charter Twp. of Broomfield, 1996 FED App. 0358P at 6-7 (6th Cir.)).
333. See Shapiro, supra note 33, at 107-09 (arguing that drawing citizenship lines to avoid
minimal diversity may be arbitrary); see also Nancy Morawetz, Underinclusive Class Actions, 71
N.Y.U. L. REv. 402 (1996).
334. For example, it may be legitimate to draw state lines in the commercial loan case
because different states have different consumer protection statutes. However, it probably would
not be legitimate to draw county lines because there is no meaningful difference in the law or
facts from one county to another within the same state.
335. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(A) (2000).
336. Frazier v. Pioneer Ams. LLC, 455 F.3d 542 (5th Cir. 2006).
337. Id. at 544.
338. Id.
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met their burden of proving that all the primary plaintiffs were state
actors.339
After Frazier, merely adding a state entity as a defendant will
not be enough to avoid federal jurisdiction. To effectively use this
provision, plaintiffs must forfeit suits against all private entities that
qualify as "primary defendants." 4 However, most states retain
sovereign immunity, protecting governmental agencies and officials
from suits for retrospective relief.34' As a result, retaining a state
court forum may come at the cost of obtaining damages. Therefore,
this provision has limited utility, unless the state of filing has waived
its sovereign immunity or only equitable relief is sought.
c. Securities actions
Under § 1332(d)(9),342 CAFA's grant of federal jurisdiction shall
not apply to any class action based solely on: (1) claims concerning
nationally traded or listed securities;343 (2) state law corporate
governance claims;344 and (3) claims for breach of fiduciary duty or
other obligations related to any security. According to one judge,
this exemption is significant because it:
339. Id. at 546.
340. See infra Part IV.B.3.b.
341. 72 AM. JUR. 2D States, Territories, and Dependencies § 97 (2007).
342. Section 1332(d)(9) states:
Paragraph (2) shall not apply to any class action that solely involves a claim-
(A) concerning a covered security as defined under 16(f)(3) of the Securities Act of
1933 (15 U.S.C. 78p(f)(3)) and section 28(f)(5)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (15 U.S.C. 78bb(f)(5)(E));
(B) that relates to the internal affairs or governance of a corporation or other form of
business enterprise and that arises under or by virtue of the laws of the State in which
such corporation or business enterprise is incorporated or organized; or
(C) that relates to the rights, duties (including fiduciary duties), and obligations relating
to or created by or pursuant to any security (as defined under section 2(a)(1) of the
Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1)) and the regulations issued thereunder).
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9) (2000).
343. The purpose of this exemption is to prevent CAFA from disturbing the impact of the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("SLUSA") on state and federal law affecting
nationally traded securities. Estate of Pew v. Cardarelli, No. 5:05-CV-1317, 2006 WL 3524488,
at *6 n.9 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2006), rev'd, 527 F.3d 25, 32 (2nd Cir. 2008) (reversal does not
affect this assertion by lower court).
344. The purpose of this exemption is to "preserv[e] the long-established rule that the law of
the state of incorporation normally determines issues relating to the internal affairs of a
corporation." Id. at *6 n. 10.
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is the only category of claims that CAFA exempts based on
the specific subject-matter of the litigation . . . [and]
evince[s] an overall legislative intention to maintain federal
protection of 'the integrity and efficient operation' of the
market for nationally traded securities while preserving the
significant role played by states in the regulation of
business entities and securities that are not nationally
traded.345
Most courts conclude that this provision is an exception and that
the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. For example, in Kurz v.
Fidelity Management & Research Company,346 the court sua sponte
ordered the plaintiff to show cause why the action should not be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under §
1332(d)(9)(C).347
The few courts to interpret the securities exemption have
determined that it only applies to claims that arise out of securities as
defined by the Securities Act of 1933, which does not include credit
card agreements, billing statements, or finance charges. 348  These
courts have also held that the exemption only applies to actions that
solely involve claims relating to the rights, duties, and obligations
connected to securities.349 Moreover, in the Second Circuit, claims
are limited to "suits that seek to enforce the terms of instruments that
create and define securities, and to duties imposed on persons who
administer securities. '350  Therefore, taking advantage of the
securities exemption may require forfeiture of certain claims. In
sum, the securities exemption provides some opportunities to remain
in state court if securities fraud and related claims are the only issues
in the case.
345. Id. at *6 (citations omitted).
346. No. 07-CV-592-JPG, 2007 WL 2746612 (S.D. 111. Sept. 19, 2007).
347. Id. at *4.
348. Davis v. Chase Bank U.S.A., N.A., 453 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1209 (C.D. Cal. 2006)
(denying motion to remand).
349. Id. (holding that claims do not "solely" involve securities claims because the complaint
alleges consumer fraud).
350. Estate of Pew 527 F.3d at 33. But see Genton v. Vestin Realty Mortgage I1, Inc., No. 06-
CV-2517-BEN (WMC), 2007 WL 951838, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 09, 2007) (holding that claim for
statutory Elderly Abuse arose out of securities, thus, § 1332(d)(9)(C) covers it and remand is
appropriate).
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3. Pleading into an exception
To keep "truly local" controversies in state court351-and to
garner enough votes in the Senate to pass CAFA352-Congress
included several exceptions to federal jurisdiction.353 The "home-
state exception" requires at least two-thirds of the class members and
all primary defendants to be citizens of the state in which the action
was originally filed.354 The "local controversy exception" is slightly
more liberal. It requires at least two-thirds of the class members and
a "significant defendant" to be citizens of the state in which the
action was originally filed.355 A significant defendant is a defendant
from whom significant relief is sought and whose alleged conduct
forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by the plaintiff
class.356 In addition, the exception will only apply if the following
prerequisites are satisfied: (1) the principal injuries occurred in the
state of filing; and (2) no class action asserting the same or similar
claims has been filed against any of the defendants in the preceding
three years.357
In addition to the aforementioned mandatory exceptions,
Congress included a discretionary exception based on the home-state
exception theory. If more than one-third but less than two-thirds of
the class and all primary defendants are citizens of the sate in which
the action was originally filed, the court may, "in the interests of
justice and looking at the totality of the circumstances, decline to
exercise jurisdiction ....""' Congress provided six factors to guide
the court's discretion: (1) whether the claims involve national or
interstate interests; (2) whether the claims are governed by laws of
the state in which the action was originally filed; (3) whether the
class action has been pleaded to avoid federal jurisdiction; (4)
351. Shapiro, supra note 33, at 88.
352. Id. at 122.
353. Notably, the statutory text never labels these provisions as exceptions. Instead, the text
reads: "A district court shall decline to exercise jurisdiction ...." See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4).
However, since CAFA's inception, these provisions have been known as exceptions and courts
have treated them as such by placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff to prove their
applicability. For a good discussion of this anomaly, see Hoffman, supra note 214.
354. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B).
355. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A).
356. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(I)(aa)-(bb).
357. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III)-(ii).
358. Id. § 1332(d)(3).
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whether a distinct nexus exists between the forum and the class
members, the alleged harm, or the defendants; (5) whether the
number of citizens of the state in which the action was originally
filed is substantially larger than the number of citizens from any
other states or the citizenship of the other members is dispersed
among a substantial number of state; and (6) whether similar class
actions have been filed in the preceding three years on behalf of the
same or similar persons.359
All these exceptions have two features in common. First, all
require the plaintiff to prove the citizenship of a majority of the
class.3 6' This requirement can be an onerous burden because
citizenship is equated with domicile, which requires proof of
residency and intent to remain.36' Whether a plaintiff can use these
exceptions at all will depend on the presumptions that the court
permits and the amount of discovery that it allows.362 Second, using
any of the exceptions requires suing all "primary" defendants or at
least one "significant" defendant in its home state.3 63 Courts are still
wrestling with how to define these ambiguous terms.3"
This section reviews how courts have interpreted these
provisions and suggests strategies to help plaintiffs' attorneys keep
their cases in state court. In addition to discussing class membership
and the primary/significant defendant issue, this section will analyze
the principal injury requirement3 65 and consider how courts have
applied the discretionary factor test.366
a. Artfully define and prove local class membership
Before CAFA, only the named plaintiffs' citizenship mattered in
a diversity action.367 After CAFA, the entire class's citizenship is
359. Id. § 1332(d)(3)(A)-(F).
360. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (plaintiff has the burden to prove
exceptions).
361. Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem'I Med. Ctr., Inc. (Preston 1), 485 F.3d 793, 797-98
(5th Cir. 2007).
362. See discussion infra Part D.2.c.i.
363. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)-(4).
364. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.b.
365. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.c.
366. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.d.
367. Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure,
Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLuM. L. REv. 1872, 1917 n.195 (2006).
1018
Spring 2008] ARE CLASS & MASS ACTIONS DEAD?
relevant. The statute uses a "thirds" scheme: if more than two-thirds
of the class members are citizens of a particular state, the district
court must decline jurisdiction if other criteria are met;368 if less than
two-thirds but more than one-third are citizens, the district court may
decline jurisdiction;369 and if less than one-third are citizens, the
district court must exercise jurisdiction.37 Therefore, plaintiffs must
prove that at least one-third of the class members are citizens of the
state in which the action was filed to have the slightest chance of
retaining a state forum.37' In the class action context, it is virtually
impossible to investigate the citizenship of every class member.372
Therefore, courts usually rely on the class definition and statistical
evidence.
Usually, courts grant a presumption of citizenship when
plaintiffs define the class according to indicia of citizenship. These
indicia include the place where the litigant votes, pays taxes, owns
property, has a driver's license or other identification, maintains
bank accounts, belongs to clubs or churches, has places of business
or employment, and maintains a home for her family.373 For
example, one court presumed that a class of state-specific
homeowners was comprised of at least two-thirds in-state citizens.
3 74
Another court presumed that a class of New York radio station
employees included at least one-third, if not two-thirds, New York
citizens.
375
368. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4) (mandatory exceptions).
369. Id. § 1332(d)(3) (discretionary exceptions).
370. If less than one-third of the plaintiff class are citizens of the state, then no exception
applies.
371. Plaintiffs face a formidable burden to prove that the home-state or local controversy
exceptions apply because they both require two-thirds of the class to be citizens of the state.
Therefore, if all primary defendants are citizens of the state, the discretionary exception is very
useful. The burden of proving the local citizenship of one-third of the class is much less onerous,
and courts have construed the factors in favor of remand. See supra Part III.B.3.d.
372. Shapiro, supra note 33, at 87.
373. Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc. (Preston 1), 485 F.3d 793, 801 (5th
Cir. 2007).
374. Caruso v. Allstate Ins. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 364, 368 (E.D. La. 2007). Contra
Gerstenecker v. Terminix Int'l Inc., No. 07-CV-0164-MJR, 2007 WL 2746847, at *2-3 (S.D. Ill.
Sep. 19, 2007) (holding that class of all persons and entities that owned any home, commercial
building, or other structure did not pertain solely to Illinois citizens, because it could include
people who owned property in Illinois but were not themselves citizens).
375. Mattera v. Clear Channel Comm'n, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 70, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that
those who work in New York are "reasonably likely" to reside in that state); see also Hirschbach
v. NVE Bank, 496 F. Supp. 2d 451, 460-61 (D.N.J. 2007) (finding that class of all persons who
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Generally, residency alone is not sufficient to establish
citizenship."6 A class defined in terms of citizenship will not
necessarily fail, but the plaintiffs will be required to produce some
evidence of intent to supplement the class definition. For example,
in one Hurricane Katrina case, the class was defined as "patients and
the relatives of deceased and allegedly injured patients hospitalized
at [defendant hospital] when Hurricane Katrina made landfall." '377
Medical records alone did not satisfy the citizenship requirements of
the exceptions, even though they indicated that more than two-thirds
of the class lived in Louisiana.378 However, the medical records
combined with in-state emergency contact information and affidavits
of eight class members who stated their intention to return to
Louisiana was sufficient.379
Courts tend to be discriminating about the evidence that they
will accept to prove citizenship. For example, Evans v. Walter
Industries, Inc. 8 involved a class of people who were allegedly
injured over an eighty-five-year period during which defendant-
operated manufacturing facilities released various waste
substances."' To prove that two-thirds of the class members were
Alabama citizens, the plaintiffs submitted an affidavit by an attorney
who had interviewed 10,118 potential plaintiffs, 5,200 of whom were
members of the class and 93.8 percent of whom were Alabama
residents.t 2 The court emphatically rejected this evidence because
the plaintiffs' attorney did not offer any information about how the
potential plaintiffs were selected or whether the selection was
held certificates of deposit at a bank that operated exclusively in New Jersey was presumptively
comprised of at least one-third, if not two-thirds, in-state citizens).
376. See, e.g., Preston 1, 485 F.3d at 798 ("A party's residence in a state alone does not
establish domicile.").
377. Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc. (Preston 11), 485 F.3d 804, 808
(5th Cir. 2007).
378. Preston 1, 485 F.3d at 799-800. The difficulty in determining a person's domicile was
complicated by Hurricane Katrina, which dispersed New Orleans residents throughout the nation,
many of whom may not have an intention to return. Therefore, a residential address may be
sufficient proof of citizenship under other circumstances. See id. at 799, 802.
379. Preston II, 485 F.3d at 818.
380. 449 F.3d 1159 (1 1th Cir. 2006).
381. Id. at 1161.
382. Id. at 1166.
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biased.383 Moreover, the numbers in the affidavit did not provide the
court with an idea of the total size of the class, nor did it include the
number of people with claims who no longer live in Alabama.384 In
another case, the court rejected census statistics as too broad to
determine the citizenship of a class of hospital patients.385 The lesson
from these cases is that a plaintiff must be prepared to provide
specific empirical evidence about the size of the class before it can
extrapolate any conclusions about citizenship.386
The major barrier inherent in this requirement is that residency
is not equated with citizenship. Professor Stephen J. Shapiro argues
that courts should permit a presumption of citizenship to provide the
plaintiff with a fair chance to meet its burden.387 This presumption
would go a long way in allowing plaintiffs to remain in state court.
Until courts show a willingness to reduce plaintiffs' burden,
however, careful pleading and presentation of evidence is necessary.
For example, classes crafted according to indicia of citizenship are
more likely to satisfy an exception. In addition, obtaining affidavits
or similar evidence of intent from class members will weigh strongly
in favor of remand. Even if affidavits are only available from the
named class members, they will go a long way to demonstrate to the
court that the action is local in nature.388
b. Sue a primary or significant defendant in its home state
Proving local class membership is only half the battle. CAFA
only makes exceptions for cases in which plaintiffs sue all "primary"
383. Id. ("Smith's affidavit tells us nothing about how she selected the 10,118 people who
were considered 'potential plaintiffs.' We do not know if Smith's method favored people
currently living in Anniston over people who have left the area.").
384. Id.
385. Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc. (Preston 1), 485 F.3d 793, 802 (5th
Cir. 2007). However, census data may be relevant to determine the citizenship of a broader class
that encompassed an entire city or county.
386. These cases indicate that the burden on plaintiffs is extremely high. For example, to
determine the actual size of the class in Evans, plaintiffs must conduct research on the property
owners in the vicinity of the manufacturing facilities over the past eighty-five years, residents of
those properties, and individuals that suffered personal injuries during the requisite time period.
This may be an impossible endeavor. Although the court recognizes the difficulty that plaintiffs
face, it rationalizes these challenges as a "function of the composition of the class designed by
plaintiffs." Evans, 449 F.3d at 1166.
387. Shapiro, supra note 33, at 136.
388. Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc. (Preston II), 485 F.3d 804, 815-16
(5th Cir. 2007).
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defendants or at least one "significant" defendant in a defendant's
home state. However, the meaning of these terms is far from clear.
Most courts and commentators have recognized a substantive
difference between a primary defendant and a significant
defendant.389 According to the District Court for the Eastern District
of Lousiana, "a significant defendant is of less importance than a
primary defendant.""39 A student commentator stated, "all 'primary
defendants' are 'significant defendants,' but not all 'significant
defendants' are 'primary defendants." 39'
The term "primary defendant" has been used before. As
discussed above, courts in the MMTJA context defined a primary
defendant as a defendant who is directly, rather than vicariously,
liable.392 Several courts adopted this definition.393 For example, in
Anthony v. Small Tube Manufacturing Corp.,394 the court rejected
plaintiffs' argument that the in-state defendant was the only primary
defendant because it had sold the greatest volume of harmful
product.9 Instead, the court found that all the defendants were
primary because the plaintiffs' claim was not premised on a theory of
vicarious liability, indemnity, or contribution.39 However, other
courts variously define "primary defendant" as a party who is liable
to the vast majority of class members,397 responsible for a significant
389. See, e.g., Bennett v. Bd. of Comm'rs for E. Jefferson Levee Dist., Nos. CIV.A.07-3130,
07-3131, 2007 WL 2571942, at *6 (E.D. La. Aug. 31, 2007); Amanda Coney, Comment,
Defining "Primary Defendants" in the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 67 LA. L. REV. 903,
917-18 (2007).
390. Bennett, 2007 WL 2571942 at *6.
391. Coney, supra note 389, at 918.
392. See supra Part IV.A. L.b.ii.
393. See, e.g., Anthony v. Small Tube Mfg. Corp., No. CIV.A.06-4419, 2007 WL 2844819, at
*10-11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2007); Keams v. Ford Motor Co., No. CIV.A.05-5644, 2005 WL
3967998, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2005).
394. No. CIV.A.06-4419, 2007 WL 2844819 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2007).
395. Anthony, 2007 WL 2844819, at *10.
396. Id.
397. See, e.g., Kendrick v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.06-141-DLB, 2007 WL
1035018, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2007).
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portion of the loss, 398 most able to bear potential judgment,399 or the
only defendant named in one particular cause of action.4"'
The narrowest definitions of primary defendant, such as liability
to the vast majority of class members or the party most able to bear
judgment, are most advantageous to plaintiffs. However, courts will
most likely follow the MMTJA definition and interpret a primary
defendant as one who is directly liable to the plaintiff,40 ' making it
fairly difficult to prove that all primary defendants are in-state
citizens. One untested strategy to plead around this requirement is to
refrain from suing out-of-state defendants. On one hand, plaintiffs
are masters of the complaint and are generally free to sue or abstain
from suing whomever they please. On the other hand, courts may
view a blatant omission as an effort to circumvent the rules in bad
faith.40 2
To avoid this conundrum, many plaintiffs will try to use the
local controversy exception, which only requires one "significant"
defendant to be an in-state citizen.4 3  A significant defendant is a
defendant from whom: (1) significant relief is sought; and (2) whose
alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by
the plaintiff class.404 Unlike "primary defendant," this term has not
been used in any existing statute.40 5
398. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cheetah Transp., No. CIV.A.06-0005, 2006 WL 3322580, at *2
(W.D. La. Nov. 14, 2006).
399. In re Ingram Barge Co., No. CIV.A.05-4419, 2007 WL 148647, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
27, 2007).
400. Hangarter v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., No. C 05-04558 WHA, 2006 WL 213834, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2006) (holding that California's insurance commissioner is a primary
defendant because he is the only defendant potentially liable for injunctive relief, even though he
is not liable for any damages).
401. No published opinion has analyzed the meaning of "primary defendant" in the CAFA
context. However, courts are likely to find MMTJA decisions highly persuasive, considering the
similar goals between these statutes. Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., No. CIV.A.05-5644, 2005 WL
3967998, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2005). Moreover, this definition makes the most sense
because the primary defendants can be identified by looking at the complaint, without pre-trial
determinations of liability or culpability. Anthony, 2007 WL 2844819, at *8.
402. If plaintiffs omit an indispensable party, the court may join the party, if feasible, or if
not, dismiss the action. See Mattera v. Clear Channel Comm'ns, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 70, 73-77
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (dismissing class action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when plaintiff
filed suit in federal court and failed to join an indispensable party who was non-diverse).
403. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II) (2000).
404. Id.
405. Coney, supra note 389, at 918.
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The Eleventh Circuit is the only appellate court to examine the
meaning of this term. In Evans v. Walter Industrial, Inc.,4"6 the
Eleventh Circuit interpreted "significant" as a relative term." 7
Therefore, "significant relief' meant a significant portion of the
entire relief sought by the class and "significant basis" meant that a
significant number or percentage of class members had claims
against the defendant.4"8 Here, eighteen defendants were sued for
releasing various waste substances over a period of eighty-five
years.40 9 The in-state defendant operated two facilities in the area:
one closed down before 1951, and the other was located on the
fringes of the area occupied by most of the class members.410
Therefore, the court held that the in-state defendant was not a
significant defendant and the local controversy exception did not
apply.
41
Many courts have adopted the Eleventh Circuit's
interpretation.412 Some have even added an additional requirement
that the defendant is able to bear a substantial judgment.413
Unfortunately, this interpretation places a heavy burden on plaintiffs
to produce evidence of a defendant's relative culpability at an early
stage of litigation and requires courts to make preliminary decisions
about liability.414 Moreover, this interpretation causes legitimately
local actions to be removed from state court when many, but not all,
the defendants are in-state citizens but none of them can meet the
"significant defendant" test individually.415
406. 449F.3d 1159 (1lth Cir. 2006).
407. Id. at 1166-68; see also infra notes 417-20 and accompanying text (discussing the
alternative "important party" test).
408. Evans, 449 F.3d at 1167.
409. Id. at 1161.
410. Id. at 1167-68.
411. Id. at 1168.
412. See, e.g., Keams v. Ford Motor Co., No. CIV.A.05-5644, 2005 WL 3967998, at *9-11
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2005); Eakins v. Pella Corp., 455 F. Supp. 2d 450, 452-53 (E.D.N.C. 2006).
413. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cheetah Transp., No. 06-0005, 2006 WL 3322580, at *2 (W.D.
La. Nov. 14, 2006) (plaintiffs offered no evidence to establish ability of in-state defendants to
satisfy a judgment potentially amounting to $5 million or more).
414. Shapiro, supra note 33, at 129. In fact, the reason that courts interpreted "primary
defendants" to mean defendants charged with direct liability is to avoid requiring pre-trial
determinations of liability. See supra note 402. The majority significant defendant test is
unworkable and inefficient.
415. Shapiro, supra note 33, at 129 (arguing that the test leads to "an absurd result" when all
but one of the defendants are in-state citizens).
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The better interpretation is that a significant defendant is an
important party to the suit. At least the District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana adopted this view. In Caruso v. Allstate
Insurance Co.,4 6 an in-state defendant that was the third largest
homeowner's insurer in the state was deemed a significant defendant,
even though it only held 7 percent of the market.417 According to the
court, "the third largest insurer in Louisiana, with more than $105
million in total premiums, is clearly a major player in the insurance
market by any measure. '  This interpretation can prevent
fraudulent joinder of peripheral defendants to defeat diversity
jurisdiction while still allowing local actions to remain in state court.
A plaintiff's attorney should argue for this interpretation. If the court
does not accept this argument, then the case will more likely be
litigated in federal court because the burden on plaintiffs to prove an
in-state defendant's relative culpability is significant.419
c. Principal injuries and the three-year limitation
After a plaintiff clears the hurdles of proving local class
membership and that a significant defendant is an in-state citizen, the
local controversy exception contains two additional requirements.
First, the principal injuries must occur in the state in which the action
was originally filed.42° Although few courts have interpreted this
provision, a split has already emerged. Some courts hold that the
provision is ambiguous and have relied on the Report from the
Committee on the Judiciary421 for guidance.422 According to the
416. 469 F. Supp. 2d 364 (E.D. La. 2007).
417. Id. at 369-70.
418. Id. at 370.
419. See, e.g., Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159 (1 1th Cir. 2006); Robinson, 2006
WL 3322580, at *4 (noting that under comparative definition, tractor-trailer driver is not a
significant defendant in a bridge accident caused by him because significant relief is not sought
from him). But see Phillips v. Severn Trent Envtl. Servs. Inc., No. 07-3889, 2007 WL 2757131,
at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 19, 2007) (holding that under comparative definition, one of two defendants
in an environmental contamination case was a significant defendant because all putative class
members had claims against it and there was no evidence that the damages from its conduct were
insignificant compared to the other defendant); Mattera v. Clear Channel Comm'ns Inc., 239
F.R.D. 70, 73-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that under comparative definition, a defendant that
employs and pays most of the current sales representative in New York is a significant defendant
in a state wage deduction class action). For a discussion of Evans, see Caruso, 469 F. Supp. 2d at
377-81.
420. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(IlI).
421. S. Rep. 109-14, pt. 6, at 40 (2005).
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report, the "provision looks at where the principal injuries were
suffered by everyone who was affected by the alleged conduct-not
just where the proposed class members were injured. '423 Therefore, a
statewide class action alleging injuries from nationwide conduct does
not qualify under this exception.424 Clearly, this is troublesome for
plaintiffs who want to stay in state court because one of the best
strategies for avoiding CAFA jurisdiction is splitting up the class into
smaller sub-classes.
However, one court rejected the report as irrelevant because
CAFA's statutory language is unambiguous and the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary issued the report post-enactment. 425 This
court interpreted the provision according to its "natural and ordinary
meaning" as the "chief or primary violation of legal rights" asserted
by the class.426 Under this interpretation, a statewide class action
based on nationwide conduct will satisfy the principal injuries
requirement.2 7
Even if courts adopt this second interpretation, however, the
local controversy exception will still preclude statewide class actions
that are based on nationwide conduct. The final requirement of the
exception is that the class action does not assert the same or similar
factual allegations that have been filed against any of the defendants
422. Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 05-5644 GAF (JTLX), 2005 WL 3967998, at *11-12
(C.D. Cal. 2005). see also Brook v. UnitedHealth Group Inc., No. 06 CV 12954 (GBD) 2007 WL
2827808, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2007) (finding that principal injuries requirement is not met
because the defendants' conduct affected health care providers in other states). But see Mattera,
239 F.R.D. at 80.
423. Kearns, 2005 WL 3967998, at *12.
424. In Kearns, a class of California consumers brought suit against Ford and a local dealer
for misrepresentations about Ford's "Certified Pre-Owned" ("CPO") program. 2005 WL
3967998, at *2. CPO was a nationwide program, so injuries suffered would have extended
throughout the country. Id. at *7. Therefore, the principal injuries did not occur in California and
the local controversy exception did not apply. Id. at *2. But see Mattera, 239 F.R.D. at 80. In
Mattera, the court purportedly applied the Committee Report standard, but it reasoned that a
statewide class was permissible because out-of-state individuals affected by the conduct would
not have standing to sue under New York law. Id. at 80. This sort of reasoning defeats the
purpose of the Committee Report interpretation because the same argument could be made for
any statewide class action under state law.
425. Kitson v. Bank of Edwardsville, No. 06-528-GPM, 2006 WL 3392752, at *8-13 (S.D.
I1. Nov. 22, 2006).
426. Id. at * 13.
427. Kitson involved a class of commercial loan borrowers who alleged that the defendant
improperly computed their loan interest. Because the primary violation of legal rights asserted by
this class was the improper calculations, which occurred in Illinois (the state of-filing), the
principal injuries requirement was satisfied. Id.
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within three years of the removed action.4 2' This requirement will
effectively preclude a strategy of breaking down nationwide class
actions into smaller state-wide classes to avoid federal jurisdiction by
using the local controversy exception.4 29 This strategy is still viable,
however, if breaking down the class into smaller sub-sets will bring
the amount in controversy below the jurisdictional threshold43 or
satisfy the requirements for the home state exception.43'
d. Appealing to a court's discretion
Courts have discretion to decline jurisdiction over local actions
in limited circumstances. When the plaintiff can prove that local
citizens comprise between one-third to two-thirds of the class and
that all primary defendants are in-state citizens, the court may
remand a case in the interests of justice. One mistake that several
plaintiffs' attorneys have made is to argue that this exception applies
without proving its preliminary requirements.432 Assuming these
initial requirements are met, the statute provides six factors to guide
the court's discretion to determine whether jurisdiction is appropriate
in the interests of justice.
First, discretion should be used in favor of remand if the law of
the state in which the action was originally filed governs the
claims.433 It is important to note that claims do not have to be
governed exclusively by state law to trigger this factor in favor of
remand. A court must determine whether state law predominates in
order to decide whether a peripheral federal claim or application of
428. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(a)(ii).
429. See Brook v. UnitedHealth Group Inc., No. 06 CV 12954(GBD), 2007 WL 2827808, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2007) ("Plaintiffs cannot simply evade federal jurisdiction by defining the
putative class on a state-by-state basis, and then proceed to file virtually identical class action
complaints in various state courts."); see also Caruso v. Allstate Ins. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 364,
369-70 (E.D. La. 2007) (denying motion to remand because the three-year requirement was not
satisfied).
430. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
431. See supra Part IV.B.3.a.
432. See Kendrick v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., No. 06-141-DLB, 2007 WL 1035018, at *4-5
(E.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2007) (finding that plaintiffs failed to prove that between one-third and two-
thirds of the class were Kentucky citizens or that any defendant was a Kentucky citizen); Kearns
v. Ford Motor Co., No CV 05-5644, 2005 WL 3967998, at *8 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (finding that not
every primary defendant was a citizen of California).
433. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)(B) (2000).
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federal regulations may be included without violating the interests of
justice.434
Discretion should also be used in favor of remand when the state
of filing has a distinct nexus with the class members, the alleged
harm, or the defendants.4 3 ' This factor is fairly straightforward.
Whenever the alleged harm occurs within the state and involves local
parties, remand is favored. For example, a distinct nexus existed
when a class of predominantly New Jersey citizens sued a bank that
was chartered by New Jersey and operated exclusively in New Jersey
for financial harms that occurred within the state. 36
Moreover, discretion should be used in favor of remand if the
number of local citizens is substantially larger than the number of
citizens from any other state and the citizenship of non-local class
members is dispersed among a substantial number of states. This
factor requires a "second body count. '437 Once the plaintiff meets the
initial burden to invoke this exception (between one-third and two-
thirds of the class and all primary defendants are in-state citizens),
however, courts seem willing to grant a presumption in favor of
remand. For example, the court in Preston v. Tenet Healthsystems
Memorial Medical Center, Inc.,435 used the same evidence that the
plaintiff produced to prove the citizenship of the class to conclude
that this factor weighed in favor of remand.439 Moreover, courts do
not appear to require any affirmative evidence of dispersion in the
absence of opposition by the defendant.4
434. See Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem'l Med. Ctr. (Preston I1), 485 F.3d, 804, 822
(5th Cir. 2007) (holding that even if complaint asserted valid federal question claim, the case is
appropriately remanded because state law claims predominate over the case in its entirety);
Hirschbach v. NVE Bank, 496 F. Supp. 2d 451, 461 (D.N.J. 2007) ("[T]he claim may involve
application of federal statutes and regulations but is ultimately governed by the law of New
Jersey ...").
435. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)(D).
436. Hirschbach, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 461.
437. Gregor P. Joseph, Federal Class Action Jurisdiction After CAFA, Exxon Mobil, and
Grable, 8 DEL. L. REv. 157, 173 (2006).
438. 485 F.3d 804 (5th Cir. 2007).
439. Id. at 823 (stating that the overwhelming number of patients permanently resided in New
Orleans, that the vast majority of emergency contact phone numbers had a New Orleans area
code, and that the affidavits of evacuees who intended to return all indicated that the number of
class members who are Louisiana citizens is substantially larger than citizens from any other
state).
440. Id. (finding that although some evacuees hold no intention of returning to Louisiana,
they are surely dispersed throughout the nation as opposed to one other state); Hirschbach, 496 F.
Supp. 2d at 461 ("While there is no proof before the Court regarding the domicile of the non-New
1028
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If the claims involve matters of national or interstate interest,
however, a court's discretion should weigh against remand." This
factor reflects Congress's concern that a state court might adjudicate
the claims of a large number of out-of-state citizens and
inappropriately apply the laws of other states.442 In this context,
"national concern" does not mean national interest in the case."3
Therefore, local cases arising from Hurricane Katrina do not involve
matters of national interest, even though Hurricane Katrina was an
issue of national concern.444
A court's discretion should also be used against remand if the
class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid federal
jurisdiction." 5  Some examples of bad faith pleading may include
splitting a nationwide class action into identical state actions,
omitting an important out-of-state defendant, or defining the class in
terms of citizenship." 6
Finally, discretion should be used against remand if one or more
other class actions asserting the same or similar claims have been
filed in the preceding three years. This factor is the same as the
requirement under the local controversy exception discussed
above. 447 The only difference is that a parallel action would not
automatically preclude a remand order; it would merely weigh
against remand.
In sum, we know that actions predominantly involving local
parties and state law claims will most likely be remanded, while
actions involving matters of national interest that have been
arbitrarily split up to avoid federal jurisdiction will not. However,
we do not know how courts weigh these factors against each other
because of the dearth of case law.
Jersey members of the class, there is no indication that any other single state has as great an
interest in litigating the controversy as New Jersey does.").
441. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)(A).
442. Preston II, 485 F.3d at 822.
443. See id.
444. Id.; see also Hirschbach, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 461 (holding that dispute involving
predominantly New Jersey citizens seeking redress for claims under New Jersey law from a bank
that is chartered by New Jersey, operates only in New Jersey, and is not affiliated with any
national bank, does not involve a matter of national or interstate interest).
445. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)(C).
446. See Hirschbach, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 461 (implying that one potential example of bad
faith pleading is expressly limiting a class to citizens of a single state).
447. See supra Part IV.B.3.c.
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e. Do the exceptions work?
The CAFA exceptions were included to keep truly local matters
in state court. However, the clumsy drafting of these provisions
combined with the high standard of evidentiary proof that some
courts require plaintiffs to meet makes it questionable whether this
goal will be realized. To achieve the objective of these exceptions,
courts should grant plaintiffs a presumption of citizenship when they
define their classes according to state residency. Further, judges
should construe the term "significant defendant" narrowly, in order
to not force plaintiffs to make pre-trial determinations of culpability.
Unless and until courts change their interpretation of these
provisions, plaintiffs will have a difficult time keeping truly local
controversies in state court.
4. CAFA Wrap-Up
Undoubtedly, CAFA revolutionized complex litigation.
Empirical studies indicate that it resulted in a profound exodus of
state-law-based claims to federal court,448 albeit an exodus of contract
and fraud cases rather than the mass tort cases CAFA proponents had
in mind.449 Moreover, the provisions that Congress included with the
very purpose of maintaining local actions in state court do not have
their intended effect. The high evidentiary burden that courts have
imputed on plaintiffs makes it extremely difficult to satisfy any of
the so-called CAFA exceptions. Nevertheless, a close look at CAFA
cases reveals that there are more opportunities than anticipated to
maintain a class or mass action in state court. In particular, pleading
448. See WILLGING & LEE, supra note 70, at 2 (noting that average monthly numbers of
diversity class actions nearly doubled after CAFA); see also FED. JUD. CTR., PROGRESS REPORT
TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON THE IMPACT OF CAFA ON THE FEDERAL
COURTS 4 (2007), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/cafa1107.pdf/$file/cafa1107.pdf
(comparing preliminary federal and state data in California and indicating that class action
activity increased in California and that a larger proportion of that activity was in the federal
court, most likely due to the CAFA effect).
449. The average number of monthly filings and removals has more than doubled in contract
cases and more than tripled in fraud claims. WILLGING & LEE, supra note 70, at 2. Although the
average number of monthly filings and removals in property damage cases has doubled, personal
injury cases have remained stagnant. Id. at 3. Most of this increase is the result of increased
original filings, suggesting that plaintiff attorneys are anticipating removal and choosing to file
actions in federal court to maintain some degree of control over forum selection. Id. at 17.
Because personal injury cases face the strictest limitations on class certification in federal court, it
makes sense that plaintiff attorneys are acquiescing to federal jurisdiction in other cases, but are
choosing to take a stand in state court in personal injury cases. Id. at 8.
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out of CAFA by limiting the jurisdictional amount or failing to
specify the amount has been a successful strategy.45
V. LITIGATING CLASS AND MASS ACTIONS IN FEDERAL COURT:
HORIZONTAL FORUM SHOPPING
In many cases, the strategies discussed above will not be viable.
No strategic pleading can keep a large interstate class or mass action
in state court. However, federalization does not necessarily mean
that a plaintiff is without forum choices. Even though CAFA
effectively precludes vertical forum shopping, it has no effect on
horizontal forum shopping, and plaintiffs can file in any proper
venue.45" ' A study of patent cases, which are exclusively within the
purview of federal courts, indicates that horizontal forum shopping
can be just as strategic as vertical forum shopping.452
For the most part, horizontal forum shopping involves the same
factors discussed in Part III that relate to vertical forum shopping.
The main difference is that procedural rules are uniform throughout
the federal system, and horizontal forum shopping accordingly
involves choosing the venue with the most favorable interpretation
and application of the law.453 In this case, a plaintiffs attorney will
be particularly concerned with how a particular district or circuit
court interprets Rule 23's certification requirements for damages
classes. Although an empirical evaluation of class certification
within the federal court system is beyond the scope of this Article,
some observations may be useful.
450. See supra Part IV.B.1 .b.
451. Venue is proper in a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all residents reside
in the same state, a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred, or a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal
jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may
otherwise be brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). For venue purposes, a corporation resides in any
judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.
§ 1391(c). Since most defendants in consumer class actions are corporations, they are likely to be
subject to personal jurisdiction in many districts, giving consumer plaintiffs the opportunity to
forum shop.
452. Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect
Innovation, 79 N.C. L. REv. 889, 889 (2001) (stating that most patent cases are brought only in a
handful of jurisdictions).
453. See generally Algero, supra note 79, at 99-102 (discussing factors that motivate litigants
to seek out a particular forum).
1031
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:965
The Supreme Court has provided limited guidance in this area. 54
In Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin,455 it held that courts are not
permitted to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of the
action when determining whether Rule 23 has been satisfied. 56
However, it also held that a class should only be certified if the
district court is satisfied that the prerequisites of Rule 23 are
satisfied, indicating that judges should probe behind the pleadings.457
In reconciling these cases, all courts agree that inquiry beyond the
pleadings is acceptable, but they differ on when further inquiry is
warranted and the quantum of proof that the plaintiff must provide to
support its class allegations.
Some courts refuse to inquire about the merits of the case
beyond the pleadings, presuming that the allegations are true. 58
However, the vast majority of circuits permit inquiry into the merits,
as long as it is relevant to class certification issues.459 Some circuits
even weigh the evidence and require plaintiffs to produce a
substantial evidentiary showing to prevail on a motion for class
certification. For example, in In re Initial Public Offering Securities
Litigation,46 ° the Second Circuit decertified a class because the
district court had improperly used a "some showing" standard and
failed to weigh the evidence.46'
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits have the most plaintiff-favorable
interpretation of class certification standards. The Sixth Circuit
recognizes that class certification may be determined by the court on
454. Jonathan M. Hoff, et al., Recent Trends in Class Certification Standards: From Eisen to
Enron, in SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2007, at 133 (PLI Corporate Law
& Practice, Course handbook Series, 2007).
455. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
456. Id. at 177.
457. Gen. Tel. Co. ofSw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
458. See Hoff, supra note 454, at 135 (arguing that courts that presume the factual allegations
to be true have viewed the Eisen prohibition on merits inquiries to constrain the Falcon
admonition to "probe beyond the pleadings" (citing Blackie v. Barrack, 534 F.2d 891, 901 & n.17
(9th Cir. 1975))).
459. See, e.g., Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154 (3d Cir.
2001) (certification decision requires a thorough examination of factual and legal allegations, so
preliminary inquiry into the merits is sometimes necessary); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc.,
249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001) (reversing certification because district court improperly accepted
the allegations in the complaint as true and failed to resolve contested issues).
460. 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006).
461. Id. at 42.
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the basis of the pleadings, if sufficient facts are set forth.462
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit held that evaluating the weight of the
evidence or the merits is improper at the class certification stage and
that plaintiffs' evidence should be relied on.4 63  Therefore, a class is
more likely to be certified in the Sixth or Ninth Circuits than in the
other circuits. However, district courts maintain broad discretion4
and sometimes do not follow the precedent in their circuit.465
Circuits also diverge on their amenability to partial class
certification. For example, the Second and Third Circuits permit
partial or conditional certification,466 while the Eighth Circuit does
not.467  Even partial certification can provide a class with
considerable settlement leverage.468
Only a few state-law-based consumer cases have reached the
circuit court level since Congress enacted CAFA. Nevertheless,
combined with pre-CAFA precedent, some trends already seem
apparent. First, the Fifth Circuit seems to be a particularly hostile
venue in which to try to certify a class. All post-CAFA motions for
class certification have failed the predominance requirement.469 In
462. See In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. 1996 FED App. 0049P at 23-27 (6th Cir.).
463. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., Nos. 04-16688, 04-16720, 2007 WL 4303055, at *4 (9th Cir.
Dec. 11, 2007).
464. The standard of review for class certification decisions is abuse of discretion. In re
Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 691 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir.
1982).
465. See Hoff, supra note 454, at 141-42.
466. See, e.g., In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding
that the district court may certify a class on a particular issue, such as liability, even if the action
as a whole does not satisfy certification rule's predominance requirement); In re Sch. Asbestos
Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1008-09 (3d Cir. 1986) (conditional class certification to determine
common issues).
467. See, e.g., In re Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297, 1303 (8th Cir.
1995).
468. Robert M. Brava-Partain, Note, Due Process, Rule 23, and Hybrid Classes: A Practical
Solution, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1386 (2002).
469. See Cole v. Gen. Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717, 725 (5th Cir. 2007) (predominance
requirement not satisfied in proposed class of nationwide automobile owners due to variations in
state law); Maldonado v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 493 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 2007) (affirming
denial of class certification to uninsured patients who filed an action against a non-profit health
care provider for charging them unreasonable rates and violating an agreement with the state by
charging them undiscounted rates for medical services, while providing discounts to insured
patients; predominance requirement not satisfied because there was an array of charges tailored to
each patient's treatment); Steering Comm. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 461 F.3d 598, 604 (5th Cir.
2006) (individual issues predominate in an action brought by individuals allegedly exposed to
smoke from fire at a chemical plant because each individual plaintiff suffered different alleged
periods, different magnitude of exposure and different alleged symptoms as a result; and there
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contrast, the Ninth Circuit has affirmed, at least in part, all the
district court decisions to certify a proposed class during the same
time period.470 In addition, the Sixth Circuit has produced a
favorable post-CAFA certification ruling.47'
Although factual differences between the cases account for some
of these discrepancies, a comparison of similar cases in different
circuits indicates some potentially significant differences. For
example, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision to
certify a nationwide class of automobile owners who alleged breach
of warranty claims for defective installation of side airbag
components because of variations in state law.7 In a case involving
similar facts, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling to
deny certification of the nationwide class but certified a statewide
class instead.473
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
refusal to certify a proposed class of individuals who were exposed
to smoke from a fire at a chemical plant due to individual medical
causation, injury, and damages issues-notwithstanding the fact that
plaintiffs' alleged injuries all arose from a single accident.474 In
contrast, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that
individual circumstances would not defeat predominance of common
issues in an unfair business practice action-notwithstanding the
company's contention that the claim required individualized analysis
of awareness and knowledge of its billing practices.475
was no common formula for computing damages); Corley v. Orangefield Indep. Sch. Dist. 152
Fed. Appx. (West) 350, 355 (5th Cir. 2005) (individual damages calculations preclude
certification).
470. Lozano v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 737 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying a California subclass of customers for
claims under the California Unfair Competition Law); Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d
952, 962 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that the court denied manufacturer's petition for interlocutory
appeal of district court's certification).
471. Daffin v. Ford Motor Co., 458 F.3d 549, 552 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it certified a class of Ohio residents).
472. Cole, 484 F.3d at 725.
473. Daffin, 458 F.3d at 552 (class sought damages for defective throttle body assembly).
474. Steering Comm., 461 F.3d at 604.
475. Lozano, 504 F.3d at 537 (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that Lozano's claim was based on uniform disclosures, so the individual circumstances
regarding how these disclosures were read or understood would not destroy predominance). This
comparison is significantly weaker than the one mentioned previously because the Fifth Circuit
case is a mass torts case. The Supreme Court indicated in Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor that
courts should be skeptical of certifying large, nationwide classes in mass torts actions because
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Although it is far too early to draw conclusions about horizontal
forum shopping, it is apparent that the circuits do interpret and apply
certification rules and precedent differently. The few post-CAFA
cases on certification indicate that the Sixth and Ninth Circuits may
be more favorable to plaintiffs, while the Fifth Circuit is particularly
unfavorable. Moreover, circuits that permit partial certification, such
as the Second and Third Circuits, are more likely to attract plaintiffs
than those that do not, such as the Eighth Circuit. This area is ripe
for additional research, particularly as CAFA pushes the majority of
class action cases into the federal system.
VI. CONCLUSION
At the end of our long and arduous journey through the maze of
MMTJA and CAFA, the ultimate question remains: Has Congress
killed class and mass actions with these statutes? Are individual
consumers left without remedy when their cases are swept into
federal court? Does this signal yet another victory of the corporate
behemoth?
The answer appears to be yes and no. Yes, invariably more
mass and class actions will end up in federal court, but CAFA does
not appear to sound the death knell of class actions for several
reasons. None of the preliminary data on CAFA indicate that
consumer class action activity is decreasing or that federal question
actions are getting pushed out of federal court. In fact, overall class
action filings have increased since CAFA was enacted,476 and many
categories of federal question cases have also seen increases.477
Moreover, not all class and mass actions are swept up in CAFA.
In fact, plaintiffs can practically make their cases removal-proof if
they involved individual issues of causation and damages. 521 U.S. 591, 622-25 (1997).
Although Steering Committee did not involve a nationwide class, it did involve individual issues
of causation, injury, and damages. Steering Comm., 461 F.3d at 604. Therefore, the disparate
outcomes between the two cases may be the consequence of factual differences rather than
divergent interpretations and applications of the law.
476. See FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 448, at *4 (noting that since CAFA was enacted, total
class action activity increased in California, but a larger proportion of that activity was in federal
court).
477. See WILLGING & LEE, supra note 70, at 2, 11-13 (stating that most of the increase in
class action activity in federal court is from federal question cases, particularly labor and
securities). Although this data indicates that individuals are not hesitating to file class actions, it
remains to be seen whether the federal docket will become clogged with state law based cases and
result in negative outcomes for federal question class litigants.
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they file an action of unspecified damages in a state within the
Eleventh Circuit. Plaintiffs can achieve a similar benefit by filing in
a Third or Ninth Circuit state, if willing to limit their damages below
the jurisdictional amount. "7
In addition, CAFA's notice and settlement provisions may
actually operate as a disincentive for defendants to remove.
Specifically, these provisions severely restrict and disincentivize
coupon settlements,47 9 prohibit "money-losing" settlements unless
non-monetary benefits substantially outweigh the loss, 40  ban
settlements that discriminate geographically,481  and impose
burdensome notice requirements on defendants when they agree to
settle a class action.482
These new provisions pose several problems for defendants.
First, restrictions on coupon settlements make class actions more
expensive for defendants because it limits a relatively painless
method of compensation that costs defendants little out of pocket.
Second, the notice provision shifts the burden of notifying class
members about proposed settlements to defendants and extends it to
appropriate federal and state officials in each state where a class
member resides.483 Failure to comply with the notice provisions can
negate the binding effect of the settlement.484 Therefore, defendants
may choose to leave cases in state court because settlement in federal
court is more expensive and time-consuming.485
Moreover, federalization may not be such a bad thing. Just as
certain state courts attracted significant class and mass action activity
because of their predisposition towards class certification, particular
federal circuits have demonstrated a particular amenability towards
certifying classes as discussed in Part V.4"6 A survey of circuit court
478. See supra Part IV.B. .b.
479. 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (2006).
480. Id. at § 1713.
481. Id. at § 1714.
482. Id. at § 1715.
483. See Puiszis, supra note 26, at 168.
484. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(e)(1) (2000).
485. See Andrew J. McGuiness & Richard Gottlieb, Class Action Fairness Act 2005 -
Potential Pitfalls for Defendants, ANDREWS CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP., Oct. 19, 2006, at 16,
available at 13 No. 9 ANCALR 16 (WestLaw).
486. Mark Herrmann & Pearson Bownas, Possible Unintended Consequences of the Class
Action Fairness Act, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Apr. 2005, at 5 (predicting the formation of
federal class action "magnet courts"); see supra Part V.
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opinions on Rule 23(b)(3) motions for class certification after CAFA
indicates that the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have been particularly
inclined to uphold class certifications or reverse denials.487 On the
other hand, the Fifth Circuit seems particularly hostile to class
certification.488
Litigating in federal courts has other potential benefits for
plaintiffs. For example, even though CAFA exceptions largely
prohibit breaking a nationwide class action into identical state class
actions to litigate in state court, nothing prevents plaintiffs from
using this same strategy in federal court.489 Because a state-based
class action only involves the law of one state, it will more likely be
certified, and plaintiffs can still enjoy substantial settlement leverage
if all the statewide classes are transferred and coordinated by the
federal Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.49 °
In conclusion, the class and mass action is not dead. Although a
substantial portion of consumer class action activity will move to
federal court, legitimate classes will still be certified in both systems.
If anything, CAFA forces plaintiffs' attorneys to rethink their
strategies for class and mass actions. Hopefully, this Article
provided a rough guide to the jurisdictional terrain after CAFA. At
least one plaintiffs lawyer sees the bright side of CAFA. According
to Victor M. Diaz, Jr., a recipient of numerous honors from the
plaintiffs' bar, "[o]n the whole, the potential shift of nearly all class
actions to federal court has elevated the class action bar and meant
better quality judicial review of corporate class-wide abuses."49'
487. See, e.g., Lozano v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming
class certification); Powers v. Hamilton County Pub. Defender Comm'n, 501 F.3d 592 (6th Cir.
2007) (affirming class certification); Daffin v. Ford Motor Co., 458 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2006)
(affirming District Court's certification of Ohio consumers); Carroll v. United Compucred
Collections, Inc., 2005 FED App. 0101P (6th Cir.) (affirmed class certification); Chamberlan v.
Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2005) (denying manufacturer's petition for interlocutory
review after District Court certified class).
488. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 493 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 2007) (denial of
class certification affirmed).
489. Some courts have refused to certify nationwide classes, but sua sponte certified state
classes. See, e.g., Daffin, 458 F.3d at 552 (plaintiff proposed a nationwide class, but court
certified a class of Ohio residents).
490. Herrman, supra note 486, at 5.
491. Posting of Walter Olson, CAFA: One Plaintiff's-Side View, to Overlawyered (June 1,
2007, 11:33 EDT), http://overlawycred.com/2007/06/cafa-onejplaintiffssideview.html.
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